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FROM RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS To REAL
CHANGE: UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST
AMENDMENT'S (NON)RESPONSE TO THE
NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF MEDIA ON
CHILDREN BY LOOKING TO THE
EXAMPLE OF VIOLENT VIDEO
GAME REGULATIONS
Renee Newman Knake*
Through the careful examination of a case taken up by the U.S. Supreme
Court during the 2010 Term, Schwarzenegger v. Entertainment Merchants
Ass'n, this article assesses a new perspective on the issue of regulating chil-
dren's access to mass media.
The dominant influence of mass media on children is recognized by ex-
perts across many disciplines, including child development, communica-
tion theory, psychology, sociology, and medicine. Numerous studies
demonstrate potential harm to children from exposure to mass media and
marketing sources. Nevertheless, courts have been reluctant to recognize
such consequences, primarily on the basis of First Amendment and free
speech concerns. Indeed, in a significant line of cases the courts have inval-
idated every legislative effort to regulate children's access to violent video
games. This legal reluctance presents a major barrier to the real world
application of and benefit from research conclusions regarding the impact
of media violence and consumer culture on children. While research of
this nature has supported attempts at industry self-regulation or voluntary
compliance with ethical guidelines, such efforts have achieved little success.
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The disconnect between law and social science has led scholars like Pro-
fessor Barbara Bennett Woodhouse to propose a reframing of the issues.
She calls for a paradigm shift from family law's traditional approach of the
parent-child-state triangle to recognize the influence of what she terms
"mass-media marketing." She proposes a new "child-centered approach to
environmental ethics," or in her words "ecogenerism," and suggests that
those who advocate for protection of children from the harms of mass me-
dia and marketing have much to learn from the environmental law and
ethics movement.
Woodhouse's proposal offers an appealing perspective for those who
support regulation of children's access to harmful media. The real issue,
however, is whether ecogenerism will evolve from academic theory to ac-
tual practice. This article tests her theory by revisiting the line of violent
video game cases to evaluate whether her ecogenerist perspective can
achieve any real change in the courts' decisions. Particular attention is de-
voted to challenges presented by First Amendment free speech protections
with a primary focus on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Schwarzenegger to
invalidate a California statute prohibiting the sale or rental of violent video
games to minors, a case that the Supreme Court is poised to soon decide.
While some speculate that the Supreme Court is unlikely to reverse the
Ninth Circuit's decision given the uniform position of other courts on this
issue, this article reveals that an ecogenerist perspective demands a reversal
by the Court precisely for that reason. Should the Court affirm the Ninth
Circuit's invalidation of the statute, the article concludes by proposing rec-
ommendations for future research and regulatory efforts from an ecogener-
ist perspective.
I. INTRODUCTIONTHIS article explores the implications of applying an ecogenerist'
paradigm shift to reframe First Amendment jurisprudence regard-
ing regulations that target the negative effects of mass media and
marketing on children. The dominance of media influence on children is
recognized by scholars across many disciplines, including child develop-
ment, communication theory, psychology, sociology, and medicine. 2 Nu-
1. See generally Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Reframing the Debate About the So-
cialization of Children: An Environmentalist Paradigm, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 85 (2004)
[hereinafter Woodhouse, Reframing] (discussing the ecology of children, the effects of
mass-media marketing on children, and the environmental approach to regulating these
effects).
2. See, e.g., Karen E. Dill & Jody C. Dill, Video Game Violence: A Review of the
Empirical Literature, AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAv., Winter 1998, at 407, 408; Douglas
A. Gentile, Muniba Saleem & Craig A. Anderson, Public Policy and the Effects of Media
Violence on Children, 1 Soc. ISSUES & POL'Y REV., Dec. 2007, at 15, 17-20 [hereinafter
Gentile, Public] (conducting a comprehensive overview of existing research on media vio-
lence effects); Douglas A. Gentile & Craig A. Anderson, Violent Video Games: Effects on
Youth and Public Policy Implications, in HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN, CULTURE, AND VIo-
LENCE 225-46 (Nancy E. Dowd, Dorothy G. Singer, & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds., 2006)
[hereinafter Gentile, Violent] (reviewing the history of violent video games and research of
1198 [Vol. 63
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merous studies demonstrate potential harm to children from exposure to
mass media and marketing sources.3 The prevalence of childhood obesity
and the increase of violent behavior in adolescents are among the list of
potential negative effects.4
Legislators at the federal, state, and local levels have made frequent
attempts to address the media's perceived negative influence on children,
ranging from taxation of certain media to limitations or complete bans on
access.5 Over the past decade, at the federal level alone, Congress has
introduced dozens of bills related to the media's impact on children.6
Administrative agencies like the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) 7 and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)8 also have been active
in regulatory endeavors and policy change.
In contrast to legislatures and agencies, the courts historically have
been reluctant to recognize media's effects on children; for example,
courts have invalidated every regulatory limit on children's access to vio-
lent video games or similar materials, primarily on the basis of First
Amendment and free speech concerns.9 Only rarely have courts upheld
video game effects); Press Release, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics et al., Joint Statement on the
Impact of Entertainment Violence on Children (July 26, 2000) [hereinafter Joint
Statement].
3. See, e.g., Gentile, Public, supra note 2, at 25-36 (finding that a strong case exists
for concluding that exposure to media violence causes aggressive and violent behavior
based upon the fact that the three most commonly used research designs-experimental,
cross-sectional, and longitudinal studies-yield similar results); see also infra notes 12-17
and accompanying text.
4. For discussion on increased violent behavior or aggression attributed to media vio-
lence, see generally id. and Kevin W. Saunders, Regulating Youth Access to Violent Video
Games: Three Responses to First Amendment Concerns, 2003 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET.
C.L. 51, 67-69 (2003) [hereinafter Saunders, Regulating] (summarizing laboratory, field,
and correlation studies involving media violence and observing "[d]espite shortcomings in
any given experiment, the aggregate of social science and psychological research clearly
demonstrates a connection between media violence generally and real world violence").
For discussion on childhood obesity and media marketing influences, see generally Jess
Alderman, Jason A. Smith, Ellen J. Fried & Richard A. Daynard, Application of Law to
the Childhood Obesity Epidemic, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICs 90 (2007) (reviewing legal re-
sponses to the marketing of junk food to children and the childhood obesity epidemic).
5. For example, in 2008, New Mexico State Representative Gail Chasey introduced
the Leave No Child Inside Act (H.B. 583, 48th Leg., 2d Sess. (N.M. 2008)) requiring New
Mexico consumers to pay an excise tax on the purchase of video games and related equip-
ment, the proceeds of which would be used to fund outdoor education for children. See
also cases discussed infra Part III.B.
6. See Survey of Proposed Federal Legislation Regarding Media and Marketing
Harm to Children 1999-2009 (on file with author).
7. See generally FCC, In the Matter of Violent Television Programming and Its Impact
on Children, 22 FCC Rcd. 7929 (2007).
8. See generally FTC, MARKETING FOOD TO CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS: A RE-
VIEW OF INDUSTRY EXPENDITURES, AcrIVITIES, AND SELF REGULATION ES-2 (2008),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/07/PO64504foodmktingreport.pdf; FTC, MARKET-
ING VIOLENT ENTERTAINMENT TO CHILDREN: A FIFTH FOLLOW-UP REVIEW OF INDUSTRY
PRACTICES IN THE MOTION PICrURE, Music RECORDING & ELECTRONIc GAME INDUS-
TRIEs (2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/violence/070412marketingViolentchil-
dren.pdf.
9. See Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir.
2009), cert. granted sub. nom Schwarzenegger v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 130 S. Ct. 2398
(Apr. 26, 2010) (No. 08-1448) (video games); Entm't Software Ass'n v. Swanson, 519 F.3d
2010] 1199
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laws that prohibit the marketing of harmful products to children.10 This
legal reluctance presents a major barrier to the real-world application of
and benefit from research conclusions regarding the impact of consumer
culture and media harm on children. While the research has supported
attempts at industry self-regulation (e.g., industry ratings systems and ad-
visory labels) or voluntary compliance with ethical guidelines, such ef-
forts have achieved little success."
The debate about regulation of media and marketing impacts on youth
has been covered exhaustively in social science journals and law reviews,
with well-argued positions supporting both sides.12 On the one hand, re-
search studies numbering in the hundreds (if not thousands, as some sug-
gest 13) document the harmful effects of media on children, ranging from
poor nutrition to increased violence and aggression.14 Indeed, a group of
leading professional health organizations, including the American Acad-
768, 770-72 (8th Cir. 2008), affg Entm't Software Ass'n v. Hatch, 443 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (D.
Minn. 2006) (video games); Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis Cnty., 329 F.3d
954, 956-60 (8th Cir. 2003) (video games); Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244
F.3d 572, 580 (7th Cir. 2001) (video games); Eclipse Enters., Inc. v. Gulotta, 134 F.3d 63, 64
(2d Cir. 1997) (trading cards); Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Webster, 968 F.2d 684, 685
(8th Cir. 1992) (motion pictures/video cassettes); Entm't Merchs. Ass'n v. Henry, No. CIV-
06-675-C, 2007 WL 2743097 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 17, 2007) (video games); Entm't Software
Ass'n v. Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d 646 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (video games); Entm't Software
Ass'n v. Foti, 451 F. Supp. 2d 823, 837 (M.D. La. 2006) (video games); Entm't Software
Ass'n v. Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1083 (N.D. Ill. 2005), aff'd on other grounds,
469 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2006) (video games); Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Maleng, 325
F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1191 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (video games); see also James v. Meow Media,
Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 687 (6th Cir. 2002) (tort liability for manufacturers of violent video
games).
10. See, e.g., Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 875 P.2d 73, 75 (Cal. 1994), rev'd
on other grounds sub. nom In re Tobacco Cases II, 163 P.3d 106 (2007) (finding unlawful
the use of "Old Joe Camel" in advertising campaigns targeting minors 'for the purpose of
inducing and increasing their illegal purchases of cigarettes"'). Notably, this case was de-
cided on federal preemption grounds, not First Amendment issues. R.J. Reynolds argued
that the state's restrictions on tobacco advertising were preempted by the Federal Ciga-
rette Labeling and Advertising Act but the court disagreed, and the parties reached a set-
tlement agreement. See generally Settlement and Consolidation Agreement, Mangini v.
R.J. Reynolds Co., No. 939359 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Sept. 8, 1997), available at http://
www.tobacco.neu.edu/litigation/hotdocs/mangini.htm.
11. See, e.g., FCC, supra note 7, at 7931, 7942 (finding that current program blocking
technology like the V-chip and the television ratings system are ineffective in protecting
children from media violence).
12. Compare MARJORIE HEINS, NOT IN FRONT OF THE CHILDREN: "INDECENCY,"
CENSORSHIP, AND THE INNOCENCE OF YOUTH (2001) [hereinafter HEINS, FRONT], and
Catherine J. Ross, Constitutional Obstacles to Regulating Violence in the Media, in HAND-
BOOK OF CHILDREN, CULTURE, AND VIOLENCE, supra note 2, at 291-310 [hereinafter
Ross, Constitutional], with KEVIN W. SAUNDERS, SAVING OUR CHILDREN FROM THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (2003), and Amitai Etzioni, On Protecting Children from Speech, 79 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 3, 24-27 (2004).
13. See Joint Statement, supra note 2, 4 (finding that "over 1,000 studies ... point
overwhelmingly to a causal connection between media violence and aggressive behavior in
some children"). But see JONATHAN L. FREEDMAN, MEDIA VIOLENCE AND ITS EFFECTS
ON AGGRESSION: ASSESSING THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 241 (2002) [hereinafter FREED-
MAN, MEDIA] (suggesting that "the figure is wildly inaccurate" and observing that "the fact
is that there are around 200 separate scientific studies that directly assess the effects of
exposure to media violence on aggression or on desensitization").
14. See supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text.
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emy of Pediatrics, the American Medical Association, and the American
Psychological Association, concluded nearly ten years ago, "based on
over 30 years of research, . . . that viewing entertainment violence can
lead to increases in aggressive attitudes, values and behavior, particularly
in children," and that this research "point[s] overwhelmingly to a causal
connection between media violence and aggressive behavior."15 More re-
cently, a 2007 comprehensive review of experimental, cross-sectional, and
longitudinal studies on media violence concluded that exposure to media
violence causes aggressive and violent behavior,16 and the research con-
tinues to advance.' 7
On the other hand, courts and free speech advocates are concerned
with any attempt to limit children's access to material based upon con-
tent, especially if that limit might impair adult free speech rights.' 8 Such
regulations are viewed as cutting to the very core of democratic principles
as well as parental authority and autonomy. Moreover, some scholars
argue that exposure to media violence does not necessarily harm chil-
dren, and some even suggest that media violence provides a healthy out-
let for violent tendencies children might otherwise act upon.19 Critics of
the social science submit that the findings of media harms are supported
by flawed research or inconclusive results and, in some cases, are even
mischaracterized, exaggerated, or the opposite of what is reported.20
Many of these criticisms are centered on outdated research, in some cases
research conducted over twenty-five years ago.21 The primary scientific-
based study supporting the position that no correlation exists between
15. See Joint Statement, supra note 2, 4.
16. See Gentile, Public, supra note 2, at 25-36.
17. See, e.g., Brad J. Bushman & Craig A. Anderson, Comfortably Numb: Desensitiz-
ing Effects of Violent Media on Helping Others, PSYCHOL. Sci., Mar. 2009, at 275-77 (re-
porting on results of two studies involving participation in violent video game play and
concluding that "findings from both studies suggest that violent media make people numb
to the pain and suffering of others"); Victor C. Strasburger, Amy B. Jordan & Ed Donner-
stein, Health Effects of Media on Children and Adolescents, PEDIATRICS, Apr. 2010, at 756,
756 (Concluding that recent evidence from research about the effects of media on the
health and well-being of children "raises concerns about media's effects on aggression,
sexual behavior, substance use, disordered eating, and academic difficulties").
18. See generally Marjorie Heins, On Protecting Children-From Censorship: A Reply
to Amitai Etzioni, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 229 (2004) [hereinafter Heins, Protecting]; Ross,
Constitutional, supra note 12.
19. See, e.g., Heins, Protecting, supra note 18, at 247-49 (summarizing the work of
"humanist media scholars" and explaining that "often, the effects are cathartic, providing
vicarious adventures or harmless outlets for aggression, as researchers like [David] Buck-
ingham, [Jeffrey] Arnett, [Henry] Jenkins, and others have found"); see also Laurie N.
Taylor, Positive Features of Video Games, in HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN, CULTURE, AND
VIOLENCE, supra note 2, at 247 (arguing that for "many children certain video games can
be both positive and necessary").
20. See Heins, Protecting, supra note 18, at 241 (discussing the work of Jonathan L.
Freedman, Effect of Television Violence on Aggressiveness, 96 PsYCHOL. BULL. 227 (1984),
who "found several instances of researchers manipulating results to bolster their theo-
ries"). Heins further observes that "social-science researchers are subject to the usual
human frailties, including the desire for prestige, career advancement, grant money, and
recognition for announcing results that political leaders and at least a portion of the public
want to hear." Heins, Protecting, supra note 18, at 246.
21. See id. at 239-41.
2010] 1201
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media violence and increased aggression or violence in children was pub-
lished several years ago2 2 and so could not take into account the signifi-
cant advances that have occurred and are still continuing to occur in mass
media research. 23
How, then, should future research and regulation respond to the
courts' continued rejection of the social science? Certainly researchers
can carry on pursuing studies that might provide sufficiently strong evi-
dence to withstand challenges under the existing legal framework. Some
suggest it is only a matter of time before science can meet the exacting
causation standard that courts currently demand.24 Legislators, for their
part, can continue to draft language in the hope of achieving a sufficiently
precise statute that can survive review under existing First Amendment
jurisprudence. Perhaps the problem lies not with a lack of advancement
in the research or a need to further refine statutory language but instead
with the entire approach.
This is not the first occasion in American history where the law has
failed to recognize a harm warranting action and redress. For example, as
child and family law scholar Barbara Bennett Woodhouse argues,
"[e]xperts who study the ecology of childhood have been sounding a
warning call much like that of the early environmentalists." 25 "In order
to address the [environmental] crisis," Woodhouse notes, environmental
activists had to push the law "to find a new way to conceptualize the
public/private dichotomy, rather than characterizing regulation as an in-
trusion on discrete parcels of private property." 26 Likewise, perhaps the
time has come for child activists to push the law to find a new way to
conceptualize media and marketing impacts.
Woodhouse proposes that these issues be considered through a new
branch of environmental ethics, in her words "ecogenerism," or "a child-
centered approach to environmental ethics." 27 She calls for a paradigm
22. See FREEDMAN, MEDIA, supra note 13, at 200-01 ("[T]his comprehensive review
of the scientific evidence leads to two clear conclusions. First . . . the research does not
provide overwhelming support for either the causal hypothesis or the desensitization hy-
pothesis. On the contrary, the evidence for both hypotheses is weak and inconsistent, with
more non-supportive results than supportive results. Second . . . exposure to media vio-
lence does not cause aggression, or if it does the effects are so weak that they cannot be
detected and must therefore be vanishingly small."). If Heins's criticism, see supra notes
12-18, regarding the human frailties of social science researchers is correct, though, it must
be noted that Freedman's review was commissioned by the Motion Picture Association of
America. Id. at x.
23. Gentile, Public, supra note 2, at 25-36; see also discussion supra note 17 and ac-
companying text.
24. See Kevin W. Saunders, Shielding Children from Violent Video Games through Rat-
ings Offender Lists, 41 IND. L. REv. 55, 55 (2008) [hereinafter Saunders, Shielding] (ex-
plaining that "each time a legislature tries to limit the access of children to violent video
games, courts must examine the science anew. The continued development of social sci-
ence, and the new insights being provided by neuroscience, make the possibility that courts
will [uphold regulations] at some point in the future very real") (citation omitted).
25. Woodhouse, Reframing, supra note 1, at 94.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 86.
1202 [Vol. 63
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shift and contends that those who advocate for the protection of children
from the harms of mass media and marketing have much to learn from
the environmental law and ethics movement.28 Her proposal offers an
appealing perspective for those who support regulation to protect chil-
dren from media and marketing harm. The real issue, however, is
whether ecogenerism can evolve from academic theory to actual practice.
This article tests Woodhouse's theory in one narrow area of mass me-
dia regulatory action-laws limiting children's access to violent video
games. The line of violent video game cases serves as a good tool in this
regard for several reasons. First, the state of the social science is most
compelling in the video game context, because the science demonstrates a
strong correlation between violent video game play and increased violent
or aggressive behavior in children. 29 Second, legislative bodies across the
country have found the social science sufficient to warrant state regula-
tion.30 Third, the courts consistently reject this same social science, a
common problem for regulation of other mass media forms as well. 3 1
A primary focus of this article is the Ninth Circuit's recent decision in
Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger to invalidate a California
statute prohibiting the sale or rental of violent video games to minors, a
decision the Supreme Court will review during the 2010 Term.32 Some
speculate that the Supreme Court is unlikely to reverse the Ninth Cir-
cuit's decision given the uniform position of other courts on this issue.33
This article reveals that an ecogenerist perspective demands a reversal by
the Court for precisely that reason.
Part II of this article provides a concise but critical summary of rele-
vant First Amendment law, including a review of the courts' treatment of
legislative efforts to regulate mass media and marketing effects on chil-
dren. Part III considers Professor Woodhouse's proposal for a paradigm
shift and evaluates the efficacy of her ecogenerist principles by applying
them to the violent video game cases. Part IV concludes that principles
of ecogenerism support a reversal of the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Schwarzenegger notwithstanding the significant First Amendment con-
28. See id. at 85-86.
29. See id. at 116 ("A child who plays interactive video games featuring violence is
more likely to behave violently.").
30. See id. at 121 (discussing the experiences of federal agencies attempting to regulate
in this area).
31. Id. at 104-05.
32. Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2009),
cert. granted sub nom. Schwarzenegger v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 130 S. Ct. 2398 (Apr. 26,
2010) (No. 08-1448). Oral argument in the case is set for November 2, 2010.
33. See Linda Greenhouse, The Court As Mr. Fix-It?, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 30, 2010, at
A19 (opining that it is "baffling" that the court would hear the case because of the consis-
tent rulings in the lower courts); see also Bill Mears, High court accepts case over violent
video games, CNN (Apr. 27, 2010), available at http://articles.cnn.com/2010-04-26/justice/
scotus.violent.video.games 1_violent-video-games-ratings-system-gaming-industry?_s=PM
:CRIME (pointing out such laws have been "rejected"). See also supra note 9 for exam-
ples of similar regulations the court has rejected.
2010] 1203
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cerns involved. Should the Supreme Court decline to do so, this article
offers recommendations for future research and regulation.
II. THE LAW'S (NON)RESPONSE TO THE NEGATIVE
EFFECTS OF MASS MEDIA ON CHILDREN
A. UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST AMENDMENT OR WHY LEGISLATIVE
ACTION CONSISTENTLY MEETS JUDICIAL REJECTION
Concern exists for a wide range of media content viewed by children,
including (but not limited to) material that promotes commercialism,
poor self-image, unhealthy diet, and violent or aggressive behavior.34
While all of these issues are significant to children's well-being, violent
video game content has been the subject of frequent regulatory at-
tempts3 5 and thus is a primary focus here. Another area of heightened
regulatory attention has been sexual material, particularly material con-
sidered indecent but not rising to the level of obscenity, which, as dis-
cussed more fully below, does not enjoy First Amendment protection.36
This article touches on, without fully exploring, the regulation of chil-
dren's access to indecent material because exposure to such material
raises concerns relevant to the violent video game debate.37
The law governing the constitutionality of regulating mass media harm
to children is difficult to navigate or predict. Different standards apply
depending on the nature of the regulation (e.g., content-based, content-
neutral, or something in between), the form of media subject to regula-
tion (e.g., broadcast and cable television, film, radio, video games, the
Internet, etc.), and the degree of constraint imposed. The complexity
multiplies when these forms of media converge. For example, should a
different standard apply to a television show depicting graphic sex or vio-
lence aired during the day on broadcast television than to the same show
made available on the Internet, a DVD, or a cellular telephone? Further-
more, in the few cases where the Supreme Court has addressed questions
critical to the constitutional analysis in this area, the opinions are highly
fact driven and have proven difficult to apply in similar but not directly
related contexts.
One point of clarity is that any regulation of children's access to media
must not violate the free speech clause of the First Amendment, which
provides that "Congress shall make no law . .. abridging the freedom of
speech." 38 This protection has been extended by the courts to cover me-
34. See, e.g., Gentile, Public, supra note 2, at 25-36.
35. See discussion of cases cited infra notes 144-98 and accompanying text.
36. See id. at 143; see also Alan Garfield, Protecting Children from Speech, 57 FLA. L.
REV. 565, 625-34 (2005).
37. For a comprehensive discussion of indecency and children, see generally HEINS,
FRONT, supra note 12. See also Garfield, supra note 36, at 625-34.
38. U.S. CONST. amend. I (made applicable to the states by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV).
1204 [Vol. 63
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dia like television, 39 radio, 40 motion pictures,41 video games,4 2 and the
Internet.43 The Supreme Court has long recognized that the First
Amendment protects "[e]ntertainment, as well as political and ideological
speech." 44 Acknowledging the complexity of First Amendment law in
this context, Professor Alan Garfield, in his comprehensive review of law
and policy relevant to government censorship of speech for children, has
gleaned "three overarching principles" to guide understanding: first, in
some circumstances the government may deny children access to speech
that cannot be denied to adults; second, children have certain free speech
rights that can "trump the government's interest in censorship" regula-
tion; and third, if a regulation designed to protect children "incidentally
denies adults access to speech," serious constitutional concerns are
raised.45
Laws designed to limit children's access to harmful media usually are
content-based and, therefore, subject to strict scrutiny.46 This is often the
death knell for a statute, since laws subject to strict scrutiny are presumed
invalid.47 Strict scrutiny requires that the government show a compelling
interest in regulating the subject matter and use the least restrictive
means in achieving that interest.48 The purpose of strict scrutiny is to
protect speech, even if it is controversial, unpopular, unhealthy, or vio-
lent.4 9 Strict scrutiny is an incredibly difficult test to satisfy. Nowhere is
this more apparent than in the context of government efforts to regulate
children's access to various forms of mass media and marketing. Profes-
sor Catherine Ross has written exhaustively on the serious difficulties
governments face in satisfying the strict scrutiny standard, particularly
with respect to demonstrating a compelling interest.50 She acknowledges,
39. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 826-27 (2002) (apply-
ing First Amendment protections to strike down regulations on cable television).
40. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-51 (1978) (applying the First
Amendment and upholding a federal law banning indecent language from radio
broadcast).
41. See, e.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952) (finding that
motion pictures fall under the First Amendment).
42. See, e.g., Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis Cnty., 329 F.3d 954, 956-58
(8th Cir. 2003) (holding that violent video games are protected speech under First Amend-
ment but noting the lower court's conclusion to the contrary).
43. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997) (invalidating the Communica-
tions Decency Act's regulation of indecent material on the Internet).
44. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981).
45. Garfield, supra note 36, at 569-70 (citations omitted).
46. See Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (applying strict
scrutiny to content-based speech restrictions).
47. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) ("Content-based regula-
tions are presumptively invalid.").
48. See United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) ("If a
statute regulates speech based on its content, it must be narrowly tailored to promote a
compelling Government interest. If a less restrictive alternative would serve the Govern-
ment's purpose, the legislature must use that alternative.") (citations omitted).
49. See, e.g., id. at 826 ("The history of the law of free expression is one of vindication
in cases involving speech that many citizens may find shabby, offensive, or even ugly.")
50. See generally Catherine J. Ross, Anything Goes: Examining the State's Interest in
Protecting Children from Controversial Speech, 53 VAND. L. REv. 427 (2000).
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conversely, that it is "not necessarily impossible" to create regulations
governing controversial speech and children so long as the targeted
speech is carefully defined and tied to a specific harm.5 1 To overcome
these difficulties, she counsels:
[L]egislatures and administrative agencies would need to demon-
strate that the speech actually harms children, that the private mar-
ket or other means are unable to provide remedies for parents who
seek them, and that the regulation would actually facilitate the
choices made by parents, including all of the diverse views of non-
conformist parents.52
To date, no legislative body or administrative agency has successfully ac-
complished this task, at least according to the reviewing courts.
Certain categories of speech are subject to less protection or no protec-
tion at all. For example, "defamation, incitement, obscenity, and pornog-
raphy produced with real children" are not protected speech under the
First Amendment.53 Likewise, certain forms of media, such as broadcast
radio, receive less protection, as seen in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.54
For purposes here, the notable categories are incitement and obscenity,
along with the Pacifica case, which offers a possible argument for a lower
level of scrutiny, at least for broadcast media. The incitement and ob-
scenity category are both addressed in turn below in the context of vio-
lent video game regulations. Pacifica is taken up briefly later in the
article.
1. Applying Incitement and Obscenity to Violent Video Game
Regulations
a. Incitement
The exception of incitement from free speech protection is based upon
the Supreme Court case Brandenburg v. Ohio, which held that the gov-
ernment may regulate otherwise protected speech if it "is directed to in-
citing or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action."55 Some have made the case that violent media
may be regulated under this exception. The argument has failed because
social science evidence has not demonstrated that video media directs or
incites violent acts. For example, in American Amusement Machine Ass'n
v. Kendrick, the Seventh Circuit rejected the studies submitted by the city
to support a violent video game ordinance because the research failed to
prove (1) that video games caused someone to commit an act of violence
rather than simply aggressive behavior or (2) that video games caused an
51. Id. at 523.
52. Id.
53. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245 (2002).
54. 438 U.S. 726, 748-50 (1978).
55. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
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increase in the average level of violence.56 Another problem with the
incitement exception is timing, for "[t]he government may not prohibit
speech because it increases the chance an unlawful act will be committed
'at some indefinite future time." 57 Thus, to satisfy Brandenburg, the
government would have to show that a violent act occurred immediately
after exposure to the violent media.58
b. Obscenity
Obscenity has been defined by the Supreme Court as "works which,
taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which portray
sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole,
do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."59 Ob-
scene speech receives no First Amendment protection, which means that
speech falling under this definition can be regulated.60 In seeking similar
treatment of violent material, academics and legislators have reasoned
that courts ought to extend the obscenity exception to violence. The
leading proponent is Professor Kevin Saunders, who maintains that ex-
treme violence, by definition, is obscene and should be treated as such
under the First Amendment. 61 As a Washington federal district court
considering this argument explained:
The Latin root "obscaenus" literally means "of filth" and has been
defined to include that which is "disgusting to the senses" and
"grossly repugnant to the generally accepted notions of what is ap-
propriate." [Thus,] [g]raphic depictions of depraved acts of violence,
such as the murder, decapitation, and robbery of women in [the
video game] Grand Theft Auto: Vice City, fall well within the more
general definition of obscenity.62
56. 244 F.3d 572, 578-79 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 994 (2001). For other
courts rejecting the incitement exception in the context of violent video game legislation,
see Entm't Merchs. Ass'n v. Henry, No. CIV-06-675-C, 2007 WL 2743097, at *5 (W.D.
Okla. Sept. 17, 2007); Entm't Software Ass'n v. Foti, 451 F. Supp. 2d 823, 832-33 (M.D. La.
2006); Entm't Software Ass'n v. Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d 646, 652 (E.D. Mich. 2006);
Entm't Software Ass'n v. Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1073 (N.D. Ill. 2005); Video
Software Dealers Ass'n v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180,1187 n.3 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
57. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 253; Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973).
58. See, e.g., Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d at 1073 (finding the Brandenburg test unmet
in context of violent video games).
59. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). The Supreme Court first recognized
the obscenity exception in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 492 (1957), but Miller sets
forth the test as it currently is applied.
60. Miller, 413 U.S. at 23.
61. See generally KEVIN W. SAUNDERS, VIOLENCE AS OBSCENrrY: LIMITING THE
MEDIA'S FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION 202 (1996) [hereinafter SAUNDERS, VIOLENCE]
("establishting] a basis in constitutional law and theory for the inclusion of violence within
the concept of obscenity"); see also Saunders, Regulating, supra note 4, at 78-93 ("con-
clud[ing] that the ordinary language meaning of 'obscene,' the case law in constitutionally
relevant periods, and the first amendment [sic] policy arguments that justify the obscenity
exception all speak just as well to violence as to sex").
62. Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1185 (W.D. Wash.
2004) (citation omitted).
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And as the Seventh Circuit has noted, "[i]n common speech, indeed,
'obscene' is often just a synonym for repulsive, with no sexual overtones
at all." 6 3 Both courts declined, however, to adopt the broad, common
definition of obscenity.64 Like all other courts considering this argument,
they limited the legal definition of obscenity to sex-related material. 65
The argument that violence should be treated as a separate category ex-
cepted from First Amendment protection has been equally unsuccessful.
Invariably, courts apply strict scrutiny to invalidate regulations prohibit-
ing children's access to violent materials. 66
c. Variable Obscenity/Harmful to Minors
Another argument advanced in a number of cases67 is that extreme
violence can be regulated under Ginsberg v. New York.68 In Ginsberg,
the Supreme Court held that a state may prohibit the sale of sexually
explicit materials to children even when those materials would not be
considered obscene for adults.69 The statute at issue criminalized the sale
of material to minors that the legislature found to be "harmful to minors"
and was intended to target material containing nudity as well as sexual
descriptions, what the Court called "'girlie' magazines."70 In upholding
the statute, the Court observed that, based upon an "'exigent interest in
preventing distribution to children of objectionable material, [the govern-
ment] can exercise its power to protect the health, safety, welfare and
morals of its community by barring the distribution to children of books
recognized to be suitable for adults."' 7 '
To reach this result, the Court applied the concept of a "variable ob-
scenity" to find that non-obscene materials could be treated as obscene
for minors. 72 "In other words," the Court explained, "the concept of ob-
scenity or of unprotected matter may vary according to the group to
whom the questionable material is directed or from whom it is quaran-
63. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 575 (7th Cir. 2001).
64. See Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d at 1185 ("Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has found
that, when used in the context of the First Amendment, the word 'obscenity' means mate-
rial that deals with sex."); see also Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 574 (same).
65. See Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d at 1185.
66. See, e.g., discussion of cases cited infra Part III.B.
67. See, e.g., discussion of cases cited infra Part II.B.
68. See generally 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
69. Id. at 636-37.
70. Id. at 631-32. The term "harmful to minors" was intended to address sex-based
material, and defined by the statute as material:
in whatever form, of nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or sadomas-
ochistic abuse, when it: (i) predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful
or morbid interest of minors, and (ii) is patently offensive to prevailing stan-
dards in the adult community as a whole with respect to what is suitable
material for minors, and (iii) is utterly without redeeming social importance
for minors.
Id. at 646.
71. Id. at 636 (citation omitted).
72. Id.; see also SAUNDERS, VIOLENCE, supra note 61, at 49-50.
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tined."7 3 Thus, Ginsberg allows a state to define obscenity in a variable
way, applying one definition to adults and another to children. Classify-
ing the materials as such allowed the Court to apply the rational basis test
to uphold the challenged statute.7 4 The Court offered two justifications:
(1) "constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the par-
ents' claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of
their children is basic in the structure of our society"75 and (2) the gov-
ernment "has an independent interest in the well-being of its youth."7 6
Following this reasoning, so the argument goes, extremely violent ma-
terial is also harmful to minors and deserves no First Amendment protec-
tion. Thus, a statute limiting children's access to violent media would
survive as long as it "was not irrational for the legislature to find that
exposure to material condemned by the statute is harmful to minors."77
Though courts often acknowledge the justifications of parental authority
and children's well-being, no court has relied on them to apply rational
basis review to violent media laws, and all courts have rejected the argu-
ment to extend Ginsberg to materials unrelated to sex, as discussed more
fully in Part 111.78
2. Other Constitutional Concerns
Also important to note in discussing constitutional issues for media
regulation are concerns that the challenged language is vague, under-in-
clusive, or overbroad. Courts will strike a law as "unconstitutionally
vague if a reasonable person cannot tell what speech is prohibited and
what is permitted." 7 9 For example, in Entertainment Software Ass'n v.
Foti, the court found Louisiana's regulation on children's access to violent
video games unconstitutionally vague because it "fails to provide specific
definitions of prohibited conduct: many of its terms, such as 'morbid in-
terest,' have no clear meaning; and there is no explanation of crucial
terms such as 'violence."' 80 Likewise, another frequent constitutional
challenge is under-inclusiveness, particularly given that violent images ap-
pear in a variety of media forms and industries.81 In reviewing other
cases that addressed legislative efforts to limit children's access to violent
video games, the Foti court observed that "[c]ourts have noted that this
73. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 636 (citation omitted).
74. Id. at 643.
75. Id. at 639.
76. Id. at 640.
77. Id. at 641.
78. See, e.g., Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F. 3d 950, 961 (9th
Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub nom. Schwarzenegger v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 130 S. Ct. 2398
(Apr. 26, 2019) (No. 08-1448) (observing that "the State confirmed that it is asking us to
boldly go where no court has gone before. We decline the State's entreaty to extend the
reach of Ginsberg and thereby redefine the concept of obscenity under the First
Amendment.").
79. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 910 (2d
ed. 2002).
80. Entm't Software Ass'n v. Foti, 451 F. Supp. 2d 823, 835-36 (M.D. La. 2006).
81. See, e.g., id. at 833.
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type of facial under inclusiveness undermines the claim that the regula-
tion materially advances [the government's] alleged interests." 82 Last,
courts are concerned with overbreadth, meaning that the language of the
regulation covers more than what the purported governmental interest
intends. For example, in Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Maleng, the
court found a ban on video games containing any violence toward a
"'public law enforcement officer"' overbroad because the restricted
materials even included "laudable struggles against evil authority
figures . . . [and] unintentional harm."83
B. THE FORM OF MEDIA MATrERS, SOMETIMES
The Supreme Court has "long recognized that each medium of expres-
sion presents special First Amendment problems." 84 Accordingly, before
moving on to consider the ecogenerist invitation to reframe the debate on
child protective media restrictions, it is helpful to summarize the concerns
unique to particular media forms. This discussion is not meant to be com-
prehensive but touches on key issues for several categories of media and
serves as a useful background for assessing the holdings of the violent
video game cases taken up in Part III.
1. Television and Radio
Broadcast television and radio represent two areas where the Supreme
Court has been willing to extend less protection, at least in the case of
indecent speech. In upholding a federal law banning indecent language
from radio broadcasts, the Court in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation cited the
unique concerns of broadcast media, namely its presence in the privacy of
the home and its accessibility to children, to justify less First Amendment
protection.85 Pacifica was extended to broadcast television in Action for
Children's Television v. FCC, which upheld the FCC's rules establishing
time limits for indecent broadcasting.86 But in the case of cable televi-
sion, courts have rejected legislative efforts to regulate indecency and
likely would do the same for other subscription media such as satellite
radio.87
As for regulating violence on television, the only successful legislation
has been the Parental Choice in Television Programming Section of the
82. Id.
83. 325 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1190 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
84. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1976).
85. Id. at 748-49.
86. See Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 59 F.3d 1249, 1260-62 (D.C. Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1072 (1996).
87. See Robert Corn-Revere, Can Broadcast Indecency Regulations Be Extended to
Cable Television and Satellite Radio? 30 S. ILL. U. L.J. 243, 249-58 (2006); see also United
States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., 529 U.S. 802, 826-27 (2000) (holding that a provision of the
federal Telecommunications Act of 1996 requiring cable operators either to scramble sexu-
ally explicit channels in full or limit such programming to certain hours was
unconstitutional).
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Telecommunications Act,88 in which Congress implemented what is com-
monly known as the V-chip 89 along with the requirement of a voluntary
ratings system on both broadcast and cable television. Proponents were
hopeful that the V-chip would effectively provide parents the ability to
control children's exposure to harmful television, but the FCC and others
have documented the failings of this system.90 Subsequent legislative at-
tempts to regulate broadcast violence have been unsuccessful. 91 While
the FCC recently issued a report finding that Congress could constitu-
tionally regulate excessively violent programming harmful to children
under Pacifica,92 the courts are likely to disagree.93
2. Marketing and Advertising
For the most part, attempts to place limits on marketing and advertis-
ing to children have met a fate similar to that of violent video game regu-
lations.94 Even efforts to regulate advertising of products that are illegal
for children to possess have been viewed with great suspicion by the
courts, though some regulations have been permitted, such as a ban on
television tobacco advertisements. 95 Because of First Amendment con-
cerns, the FTC has encouraged industry self-regulation, and, accordingly,
the motion picture, music, and electronic game industries have developed
extensive ratings systems. 96 Though in practice, as demonstrated by FTC
88. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Parental Choice in Television Programming,
Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 551, 110 Stat. 56, 139 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.).
89. Id.
90. See FCC, supra note 7, at 7931.
91. See, e.g., Indecent and Gratuitous and Excessively Violent Programming Control
Act of 2005, S. 616, 109th Cong. (2005); Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act of 2005,
H.R. 310, 109th Cong. (2005); Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act of 2004, S. 2056, 108th
Cong. (2004).
92. See FCC, supra note 7, at 7940.
93. See Faith M. Sparr, The FCC's Report on Regulating Broadcast Violence: Is the
Medium the Message? 28 Lov. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 1, 10-12 (2007) (criticizing the FCC's
report as a cursory overview at best, lacking in realistic proposals, and failing to address
the inadequacies of the social science findings as well as the high hurdles imposed by the
First Amendment or the regulations proposed).
94. See generally Randolph Kline, Samantha Graff, Leslie Zellers, & Marice Ashe,
Beyond Advertising Controls: Influencing Junk-Food Marketing and Consumption with Pol-
icy Innovations Developed in Tobacco Control, 39 Lov. L.A. L. REV. 603 (2006) (reviewing
legal difficulties in controlling the effects of mass media advertising and marketing of un-
healthy products to children and proposing strategies for future efforts).
95. See Capital Broad. Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 584-85 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd
sub nom. Capital Broad. Co. v. Kleindienst, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972). Most restrictions on
tobacco advertising, however, have been invalidated. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v.
Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 561-67 (2001). Indeed, the American Civil Liberties Union already
has expressed concern with advertising restrictions contained in the recently adopted fed-
eral Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat.
1776 (2009). See Letter from ACLU to U.S. Senate (June 1, 2009), available at http://www.
aclu.org/free-speech/aclulettersenatefamily-smokingprevention-and tobacco-contnl_
act/ (calling for narrowing on First Amendment grounds of advertisement restrictions).
96. See FTC, MARKETING VIOLENT ENTERTAINMENT TO CHILDREN: A FIFTH FoL
LOW-UP REVIEW OF INDUSTRY PRACTICES IN THE MOTION PICTURE, Music RECORDING
AND ELECTRONIC GAME INDUSTRIEs, supra note 8.
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studies, these ratings systems have proven ineffective.97
3. Internet
Congress has made several efforts to protect children from harmful In-
ternet content, notably through the Communications Decency Act98 and
the Child Online Protection Act.99 These efforts also have failed when
challenged on First Amendment grounds. 00 One exception has been
United States v. American Library Ass'n,10 where the Supreme Court up-
held the Children's Internet Protection Act,102 requiring schools and li-
braries that receive federal aid to install filters on all computers.103
Another area of emerging media is online social networks such as
Facebook or MySpace. Here, concerns may extend far beyond violent
content exposure to include protection from sexual predators, identity
theft, and reputational harms.104 Regulation has yet to occur, but it is
important to recognize that advances in technology will only continue to
present new kinds of media where potential harm to children ought to be
examined and, if appropriate, regulated. 05
4. Video Games
One aspect of the video game that some contend make it unique from
other media is the highly interactive nature.106 It has been suggested that
97. FTC, supra note 96. For further discussion of efforts to control harmful marketing
to children, see FTC, MARKETING FOOD TO CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS: A REVIEW OF
INDUSTRY EXPENDITURES, AcrVITIES, AND SELF-REGULATION, supra note 8.
98. See Communications Decency Act (CDA) of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2000), partially
invalidated by Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
99. See Child Online Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2000), invalidated by Ashcroft v.
ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004).
100. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. at 660-61 (holding that the Child Online Protec-
tion Act violated the First Amendment); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 882 (holding that the
Communications Decency Act violated the First Amendment).
101. 539 U.S. 194, 209-14 (2003) (plurality opinion). Efforts to extend the reasoning of
American Library for regulations limiting children's access to violent media have been
unsuccessful. See, e.g., Entm't Merchs. Ass'n v. Henry, No. Civ-06-675-C, 2007 WL
2743097, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 17, 2007).
102. See Children's Internet Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 254(h) (2000).
103. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. at 199.
104. See Sheerin N. S. Haubenreich, Parental Rights in MySpace: Reconceptualizing the
State's Parens Patriae Role in the Digital Age, 31 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 223, 253-54
(2009) (arguing that future reputational harm justifies government interest in regulating
children's access to the Internet).
105. See id. at 249-53. See also Patrick M. Garry, Defining Speech in an Entertainment
Age: The Case of First Amendment Protection for Video Games, 57 SMU L. REv. 139, 160
(2004) (arguing that courts ought to consider whether emerging media like video games
are deserving of the same First Amendment protection as political speech and suggesting
that failure to do so "poses a crowding-out problem: a situation where media content that
has little value for a democratic society crowds out the kind of political and public interest
speech that, according to Alexander Meiklejohn, the First Amendment is intended to
protect").
106. The interactive nature of video games frequently is raised in the context of school
shootings where the assailants appeared to be heavily influenced by violent video game
play. For a discussion of school shooting cases in which violent video games were involved,
see Saunders, Regulating, supra note 4, at 52-55. See also James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300
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this characteristic makes it all the more important (and justifiable) to reg-
ulate children's access.107 The courts considering this position have dis-
agreed. For example, Judge Posner, writing for the majority in Kendrick,
dismissed the interactivity of video games as no different from literature,
movies, or television. 08 There have been few attempts to regulate sex-
based content in video games, with only those regulations directly target-
ing obscenity surviving.109 A handful of states have enacted laws that
require video game sellers to post signs containing information about the
availability of an industry rating system to aid in the selection of
games. 110 To date, none of these laws have been challenged. As dis-
cussed more fully in Part III.B, no law limiting children's access to violent
video games has successfully withstood legal challenge despite numerous
attempts.
C. REMAINING QUESTIONS
The myriad unsuccessful attempts to address mass media and market-
ing harm to children, only a sample of which are highlighted here, raise
two key questions. First, at what point, if ever, will courts recognize a
category of speech that causes harm to minors, such as extremely violent
material, as undeserving of First Amendment protection? Second, given
that courts consider current social science insufficient to justify regulation
of harmful media under the First Amendment strict scrutiny test, how
should future research and regulation be structured? As Part III reveals,
the ecogenerist perspective advocated by Professor Woodhouse offers at
least an initial response to both points of inquiry.
F.3d 683, 687-88 (6th Cir. 2002) (denying tort relief to parents of students killed when
classmate discharged firearms in school who sued video, film, and Internet companies that
produced violent material alleged to have influenced the killer).
107. See, e.g., Saunders, Regulating, supra note 4, at 71-72 (discussing causation and
video games). Saunders observes that "[tihe interactivity of the violent video game in
which the player himself responds using virtual violence would seem more likely to lead
the player to respond with violence in future situations than would simply viewing charac-
ters on a screen," but also concedes that research of violent video games "has not devel-
oped to the point" to support this conclusion. Id. at 71-72.
108. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 2001).
109. Compare Entm't Software Ass'n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2006)
(invalidating statute that criminalized the sale or rental of sexually explicit video games to
minors), with MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 11-203 (LexisNexis 2009) (criminalizing the
sale and display of obscene materials to minors).
110. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 19.188.040 (2007) (requiring video game retailer to
"post signs providing information to consumers about the existence of a nationally recog-
nized video game rating system, or notifying consumers that a rating system is available, to
aid in the selection of a game if such a rating system is in existence").
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III. BRIDGING THE DIVIDE BETWEEN
SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
DOES ENVIRONMENTAL LAW OFFER A SOLUTION?
A. LOOKING TO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND ETHICS
The law's continued inability to recognize the negative effects of media
and marketing on children-harm documented by social science and the
medical community-has led some legal scholars to "examine this discon-
nect between law and reality . . . [by considering] the effect of the media
and advertising industries on children's socialization."'11 Professor Laura
Rosenbury and others recognize that the traditional model, focusing on
the role of parents and the state in the lives of children, fails to account
for ways that the media and advertising "industries supplement, and often
supplant, parental and state authority over children."112
Perhaps the most radical proposal for reframing these issues has come
from Professor Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, who:
argues for an EcoGenerist paradigm, based on ecological principles
developed in the environmental arena, informed by the principle of
generism, or the primacy of supporting and nurturing the next gener-
ation. She analogizes the violence in culture, with its known negative
effects on children, to a toxic substance in children's environment,
and calls upon us to learn from environmentalists how to think about
and address the toxic qualities of children's cultural and social
environment. 113
For Woodhouse, "[a]n ecogenerist is committed to maintaining and re-
storing a healthy social and physical environment for the benefit of the
next generation and generations to come." 114 She has employed her
ecogenerism theory to advocate for reform to child welfare and protec-
tion laws in a variety of ways,115 but for purposes of this article the most
111. Laura A. Rosenbury, Between Home and School, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 833, 849
(2007).
112. Id.; see also Garfield, supra note 36, at 602 (discussing justifications for "child-
protection censorship" under a "'harm theory'" and a "'parental support theory'"); Et-
zioni, supra note 12, at 4 (proposing an alternative model that balances the "two core
values" of free speech and protection of children).
113. Nancy E. Dowd, Introduction to HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN, CULTURE, AND Vio-
LENCE, at xxiii-xxiv (Nancy E. Dowd, Dorothy G. Singer & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds.,
2006). This article provides a summary of ecogenerism but does not fully explore all
dimensions of Woodhouse's proposed "canon of environmental ethics as the model for
thinking about children's environmental protection." Barbara Bennett Woodhouse,
Ecogenerism: An Environmentalist Approach to Protecting Endangered Children, 12 VA. J.
Soc. POL'Y & L. 409, 424 (2005) [hereinafter Woodhouse, Ecogenerism]. For a more de-
tailed explanation of ecogenerism, see generally Woodhouse, Ecogenerism, supra, at
441-47; Woodhouse, Refraining, supra note 1, at 146-49.
114. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Race, Culture, Class, and the Myth of Crisis: An
Ecogenerist Perspective on Child Welfare: Keynote, 81 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 519, 528-29
(2007) [hereinafter Woodhouse, Race].
115. See, e.g., Woodhouse, Ecogenerism, supra note 113 (examining ecogenerism in the
contexts of advertising targeted to children and the erosion of free play space); Wood-
house, Race, supra note 114, at 520-30 (examining ecogenerism in relation to foster care
and child custody).
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relevant aspect is her suggestion that the lessons learned by environmen-
talists can be drawn upon by those seeking to address media harm to
children. 116 Prior to the emergence of modem environmental law, state
and local government could not "manag[e] the competing demands be-
tween the needs of local businesses, the need to grow, and resource pro-
tection."117 Similarly, the competing demands associated with regulating
media effects on children have become unmanageable.
According to Woodhouse, "mass-media marketing is not a benign en-
trepreneurial enterprise-it is a potentially destructive assault on chil-
dren's environment that we must strive to understand and attempt to
regulate."" 8 She uses the term "mass-media marketing" to describe
what she characterizes as a "force . . . having a deleterious effect on the
culture of childhood" 119 and identifies several ways in which this force
"has changed the ecology of childhood."120 These influences include the
dominance of advertising, a diminished role of parents and adults in the
lives of children, the disparate impact of adverse media effects on minor-
ity and poor children, and the harmful effects of violent or sexual media
on children.121 "Mass-media marketing," argues Woodhouse, "has dis-
placed parental authority as the primary force in socializing our children,
with profound impact on the social and cultural environment of
childhood. "122
In regulating mass media harm, ecogenerist theory "would place chil-
dren at the center of the analysis rather than at the periphery."123 Ac-
cordingly, where the First Amendment focuses primarily on protection of
adult free speech rights in evaluating regulatory limits on children's ac-
cess to harmful media, environmental law is primarily concerned with the
level of toxins to which the most vulnerable are exposed.124 Likewise,
under an ecogenerist model, media harm decisions should prioritize con-
cern about the level of "toxic" media to which children are exposed over
free speech interests.125 In other words, following ecogenerist principles
116. In some ways, this article can be understood as a response to Woodhouse's call to
"advocates for children . . . to articulate and promote what [she has] termed 'environmen-
tal ethics for children,"' a process that "involve[s] either rethinking and rejecting, or con-
sciously reaffirming, ethical frameworks that pervade our laws and policies." Woodhouse,
Ecogenerism, supra note 114, at 433-34. Here, the rethinking involves questioning tradi-
tional application of First Amendment principles in the context of children's access to
modern media, especially violent video games.
117. Carol M. Browner, Environmental Protection: Meeting the Challenges of the
Twenty-First Century, 25 HARV. ENVTh. L. REV. 329, 330 (2001).
118. Woodhouse, Reframing, supra note 1, at 94-95.
119. Id. at 97.
120. Id. at 101.
121. Id. at 101-09.
122. Id. at 85.
123. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Cleaning Up Toxic Violence: An EcoGenerist Para-
digm, in HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN, CULTURE, AND VIOLENCE 429 (Nancy E. Dowd, Doro-
thy G. Singer & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds., 2006) [hereinafter Woodhouse, Cleaning].
124. See id.
125. See Woodhouse, Race, supra note 114, at 528 ("Instead of elevating individual lib-
erty above all other values, [ecogenerism] would highlight the interconnectedness of all
systems including our social systems.").
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would shift the focus of inquiry to children and future generations. This
kind of reprioritization of traditional liberties has been applied by the
Supreme Court in other contexts related to children.126 As Woodhouse
writes, "[i]nstead of elevating individual liberty above all other values,
[ecogenerism] would highlight the interconnectedness of all systems in-
cluding our social systems." 12 7
Woodhouse also draws upon a variety of environmental ethics theories
to reexamine traditional conceptions about media harm to children. For
example, she observes that environmentalists' "deep ecology" solves
problems by pushing beyond the surface and replacing "the dominant
Western paradigm [of] Newtonian Science, which assumes that nature can
be divided into parts," with a "relational [model] that sees all organisms"
as interrelated. 1 2 8 She looks to "ecofeminism," particularly its "em-
phasi[s on] the connection between the actions and fates of individuals
and the future of the relationships and ecological communities that are
necessary . . . for the next generation to survive and thrive."129 Other
relevant theories include "[s]ustainable development" and "restoration
ecology," which focus on prevention and balance.o30 Similarly, she notes
the parallels between environmentalists' use of "[b]iological control" (i.e.,
use of natural organisms to fight invaders) and "media education" advo-
cates who "seek to protect children against harmful media by exposing
126. For example, in Belloti v. Baird the Court observed:
"Children have a very special place in life which law should reflect. Legal
theories and their phrasing in other cases readily lead to fallacious reasoning
if uncritically transferred to determination of a State's duty towards chil-
dren." The unique role in our society of the family, the institution by which
"we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral and
cultural" requires that constitutional principles be applied with sensitivity
and flexibility to the special needs of parents and children. We have recog-
nized three reasons justifying the conclusion that the constitutional rights of
children cannot be equated with those of adults: the peculiar vulnerability of
children; their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature
manner; and the importance of the parental role in child rearing.
Properly understood, then, the tradition of parental authority is not incon-
sistent with our tradition of individual liberty; rather, the former is one of the
basic presuppositions of the latter. Legal restrictions on minors, especially
those supportive of the parental role, may be important to the child's chances
for the full growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a free
society meaningful and rewarding.
443 U.S. 622, 633-34, 638-39 (1979) (citations omitted). Belloti, of course, follows the
traditional paradigm in its discussion of parental authority, whereas ecogenerism requires a
child-centered approach. But the case illustrates the Supreme Court's recognition that, in
limited circumstances, interests related to children's "growth and maturity" may be ele-
vated over the First Amendment's liberty concerns. Id. at 638-39. An ecogenerist per-
spective would argue that, likewise, a child-centered approach is not inconsistent with our
tradition of individual liberty, indeed, it is a "basic presupposition[ lof the latter." Id. at
638.
127. Woodhouse, Race, supra note 114, at 528.
128. Woodhouse, Cleaning, supra note 123, at 423; see also Woodhouse, Reframing,
supra note 1, at 138.
129. Woodhouse, Cleaning, supra note 123, at 423.
130. Id. at 424.
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them to materials and media inputs that educate them to be critical
consumers." 131
One particularly relevant lesson environmentalists offer the movement
to protect children from harmful media is how to "avoid[] paralysis in the
face of scientific uncertainty and natural flux."13 2 For example,
"[o]pponents of environmental regulation have launched sharp critiques
at the methods used to calculate costs and benefits, claiming that they
overstate the risks and underestimate the costs, and environmentalists
have responded with critiques of their own, charging the opposition with
manipulating the data and the methods of computations to understate the
risks and inflate the costs."s3 3 These arguments are strikingly similar to
those in the media violence debate. Environmentalists successfully estab-
lished a regulatory framework for evaluating empirical science in the face
of uncertainty and questions about the validity of research. 134 The move-
ment to protect children from media harm can do so as well.
Woodhouse's proposal is persuasive on many levels. The real issue,
however, is whether ecogenerism can evolve from academic theory to ac-
tual practice. The concept of ecogenerism is appealing to those frustrated
by the current legal framework, but reconciling it with the First Amend-
ment presents obstacles. Woodhouse herself recognizes this tension:
An environmental approach would . . . impinge on distinctions be-
tween speech and conduct that are integral to our thinking about
intellectual freedom and the role of the First Amendment. . . . There
are serious dangers to breaching the First Amendment distinctions
that protect expression from content-based regulation. Not least of
these is the process of identifying speech that harms. Falsely crying
"fire" in a crowded theater is the classic example of harmful speech
that overcomes the individual's ability to process and filter informa-
tion. But we generally assume that the individual will process and
filter the message, and that it is the individual's choice how to re-
spond to speech, not the speech itself, which produces the harmful
effects. A toxic gas can be identified as harmful through scientific
testing and can be regulated or prohibited. But toxic media
images?135
When first describing the ecogenerist approach she "set aside these is-
sues for another day,"1 36 and since then has taken up the First Amend-
ment implications only in a limited discussion related to regulation of the
Internet.13 7 But her proposal cannot be taken seriously without fully ad-
dressing the intersections between ecogenerism and the First Amend-
ment. While Woodhouse may be correct that "this issue is not about
131. Woodhouse, Refrarning, supra note 1, at 142.
132. Id. at 144.
133. Id.
134. See id. at 144-48.
135. Id. at 95-96.
136. Id. at 96.
137. See Woodhouse, Cleaning, supra note 123, at 427-30.
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values of parental autonomy or values of free expression, but rather
about values of generational justice and human flourishing,"1 38 courts
have made clear that free speech concerns cannot be ignored.
Environmental law, both in its early conception and in its ethical foun-
dations, offers many useful parallels, but the comparison is less helpful in
the face of the First Amendment. Whatever struggles may have been
faced by the early environmentalists, establishing the framework of mod-
ern environmental law did not require fundamental reshaping of First
Amendment doctrine. This is not to say that environmental law has been
immune from constitutional challenge. As Professor Robert Percival ex-
plains, "[v]arious industry groups have pressed the courts to declare un-
constitutional the Superfund legislation, the Endangered Species Act, the
Clean Water Act, and the Safe Drinking Water Act."139 The nature of
the challenges, however, focused primarily on Congress's authority to
regulate interstate commerce activities,140 which requires a substantially
lower level of scrutiny than legislation that raises First Amendment is-
sues.141 Unlike the area of media harm to children, "courts have rejected
(or declined to reach) virtually every constitutional challenge to the fed-
eral environmental laws."142 No matter how strong an argument
ecogenerism might offer, the Supreme Court is unlikely to apply, simply
by analogy to environmental law, the lower level of scrutiny afforded to
environmental regulations in the context of content-based regulations
targeting protected speech.143 Notwithstanding the difficulties the First
Amendment presents, applying ecogenerist principles to the line of cases
striking down violent video game regulations reveals ways in which Pro-
fessor Woodhouse's paradigm shift may very well be warranted.
B. VIOLENT VIDEO GAME REGULATION AS A CASE STUDY
Perhaps the best way to explore the practical implications of Wood-
house's call for a paradigm shift in the context of regulating children's
access to harmful media is to use as a case study the series of court deci-
sions invalidating laws that limit children's access to violent video games.
138. See Woodhouse, Reframing, supra note 1, at 129.
139. Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law in the Twenty-First Century, 25 VA.
ENvTL. L.J. 1, 10 (2007) (footnotes omitted).
140. See id. (footnotes omitted).
141. See discussion of rational basis scrutiny supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
142. Percival, supra note 139, at 11. Moreover, in upholding federal environmental
laws, the courts "have relied on generalized judgments made by Congress concerning the
importance of national regulatory programs to prevent harm to the environment." Id.
143. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. 803, 815 (2000) ("We
have made clear that the lesser scrutiny afforded regulations targeting the secondary ef-
fects of crime or declining property values has no application to content-based regulations
targeting the primary effects of protected speech."); see also Woodhouse, Reframing, supra
note 1, at 122 ("Even among environmentalists, the notion of an environmentalist ap-
proach to abating a toxic mass-media culture may encounter opposition. Because of First
Amendment concerns, even those who generally favor regulation of chemical environmen-
tal toxins or invasive exotic species might hesitate to extend regulation to potentially toxic
media influences.").
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Courts have invalidated statutes and ordinances limiting children's access
to violent video games in California,144 Illinois,145 Indiana, 146 Louisi-
ana,147 Michigan,148 Minnesota,149 Missouri,15 0 Oklahoma,151 and Wash-
ington.152 The Ninth Circuit's decision in Schwarzenegger, declaring
unconstitutional a California statute that placed limits on the sale and
rental of violent video games to children, is the most recent federal appel-
late court decision in this area.
Before turning to the Schwarzenegger case, it is important to place it in
the context of the other courts' rulings on violent video game regulations.
A cursory review of the consistent outcome in each of these cases might
lead one to abandon any future efforts to limit children's access to violent
video games as a waste of time and financial resources. 153 Filtering the
cases through the lens of ecogenerism, however, provides several reasons
for pursuing these protections notwithstanding this precedent. The line
of violent video games cases might be consistent in their conclusions, but
employing ecogenerist principles shows that they also are consistently
flawed in their application of strict scrutiny and rejection of social
science.
1. The Pre-Schwarzenegger Cases from an Ecogenerist Perspective:
Flaws in Selecting Scrutiny and Screening Social Science
A review of the cases leading up to Schwarzenegger reveals at least two
areas where ecogenerism offers significant insights: the application of
strict scrutiny and the analysis of the social science evidence. One of the
first courts to invalidate a violent video game regulation was the Seventh
Circuit in Kendrick, a 2001 case involving an Indianapolis ordinance re-
quiring parents to accompany minors playing video games with "graphic
144. See Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 967 (9th Cir.
2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 2398 (Apr. 26, 2010) (No. 08-1448).
145. See Entm't Software Ass'n v. Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1081 (N.D. Ill.
2005), affd on other grounds, 469 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2006).
146. See Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 579-80 (7th Cir.
2001).
147. See Entm't Software Ass'n v. Foti, 451 F. Supp. 2d 823, 836-37 (M.D. La. 2006).
148. See Entm't Software Ass'n v. Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d 646, 656 (E.D. Mich.
2006).
149. See Entm't Software Ass'n v. Swanson, 519 F.3d 768, 772 (8th Cir. 2008), affg
Entm't Software Ass'n v. Hatch, 443 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (D. Minn. 2006).
150. See Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis Cnty., 329 F.3d 954, 960 (8th
Cir. 2003).
151. See Entm't Merchs. Ass'n v. Henry, No. CIV-06-675-C, 2007 WL 2743097, at *9
(W.D. Okla. Sept. 17, 2007).
152. See Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1191 (W.D.
Wash. 2004).
153. See, e.g., Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Violence and Video Games 2006:
Legislation and Litigation, 8 TEX. REv. ENT. & SPORTS L. 49, 51 (2007) (noting that the
state of Illinois was required to pay to the video game industry $510,528.64 in attorneys'
fees spent challenging a violent video game law and citing a video game industry represen-
tative's argument that given the uniform precedent on this issue further litigation is a waste
of taxpayer dollars).
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violence" in public places. 154 Kendrick illustrates the problematic treat-
ment of First Amendment scrutiny and the rejection of the social science
that is characteristic of the violent video game cases. As to the First
Amendment, the court applied strict scrutiny, dismissing the argument
that violence be treated as obscenity but reached this conclusion without
a meaningful consideration of the children's interests as an ecogenerist
perspective would demand.155 The court recognized that "the fact that
obscenity is excluded from the protection of the principle that govern-
ment may not regulate the content of expressive activity . . . [does not]
foreclose[ ] a like exclusion of violent imagery," though later courts ap-
plied Kendrick to do exactly that. 156 Had the court approached the scru-
tiny from an ecogenerist framework, at a minimum it would have
engaged in a more developed analysis of such a critical determination
(one not previously considered by any other federal appellate court or
the Supreme Court). The considerations articulated by Woodhouse are
at least as compelling as those interests identified by the Kendrick court
in its discussion declining to extend Ginsberg.57 Had the court evaluated
Ginsberg with a focus on the interests of children and preserving future
generations, it would have been difficult not to extend Ginsberg to cover
extremely violent material.
As to the social science, the primary evidence consisted of two psycho-
logical studies reported by Iowa State University Professor Craig Ander-
son'58 and a colleague.159 The Kendrick court determined that the
research did not support the ordinance because there was "no indication
that the games used in the studies [were] similar to those [targeted]" and
"[t]he studies d[id] not find that video games have ever caused anyone to
commit a violent act."1 60 The court was most concerned not with the
154. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 573 (7th Cir. 2001).
While Kendrick is considered the first in the line of modern video game cases, it should be
noted that a series of earlier cases held video games were not protected by the First
Amendment on the basis that they should be treated "'like a pinball game, a game of
chess, or a game of baseball, [a]s pure entertainment with no informational element."'
Saunders, Regulating, supra note 4, at 93-97 (discussing early video game cases). The mod-
ern video games, however, have been afforded First Amendment protection without ex-
ception. See supra notes 144-152.
155. See Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 575-76. The court repeated and speculated about the
interests of the government in enacting the ordinance and observed that children have First
Amendment rights, but engaged in no meaningful examination of the issues from the per-
spective of the child subject to the regulation. Id. at 576-78.
156. Id. at 574.
157. Id. at 576-78.
158. Dr. Anderson is considered the "leading researcher" in the area of violent video
games and harm to children. See Saunders, Shielding, supra note 24, at 60. As seen in the
other cases discussed in this section, his work has been considered by all courts reviewing
challenges to violent video game legislation. For a comprehensive list of his research in
this field since 1995 see http://www.psychology.iastate.edu/faculty/caa/recpub.html.
159. Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 578 (citing Craig A. Anderson & Karen E. Dill, Video
Games and Aggressive Thoughts, Feelings and Behavior in the Laboratory and in Life, 78 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 772 (2000)). Anderson's research has been relied upon in
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methodology or sufficiency of Dr. Anderson's research but that the re-
search did not support the material targeted by the ordinance. 161 Judge
Richard Posner, writing for the panel, suggested that "a more narrowly
drawn ordinance might survive a constitutional challenge," particularly if
it had covered "games [that] used actors and simulated real death and
mutilation convincingly, or if the games lacked any story line and were
merely animated shooting galleries (as several of the games in the record
appear to be)."1 6 2 Nevertheless, courts have subsequently relied upon
Kendrick to dismiss Dr. Anderson's research even when the research is
directly related to the regulated material.163 An ecogenerist approach, as
discussed more fully in the context of the Schwarzenegger case below,
would require a set of consistent, science-based standards for evaluating
social science.
The Eighth Circuit is the only other federal appellate court, besides the
Seventh and Ninth Circuits, to consider violent video game legislation. It
has done so on two occasions, first in 2003 with Interactive Digital
Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County 6 4 and again in 2008 with Entertain-
ment Software Ass'n v. Swanson.165 Both of these cases suffer from Ken-
drick's flaws, a point the Eighth Circuit implicitly acknowledged in the
2008 case. 166 The 2003 case involved a St. Louis County ordinance mak-
ing it unlawful to "sell, rent, or make available graphically violent video
games to minors, or to 'permit the free play of' graphically violent video
games by minors, without a parent or guardian's consent."167 The court
was heavily influenced by Kendrick, as evidenced by the devotion of a
significant portion of its own opinion to a discussion of the Seventh Cir-
cuit's decision. 168 The Eighth Circuit applied strict scrutiny, again failing
to engage in any real analysis from the viewpoint of the child.169 The
lower court had reviewed studies and heard testimony from Dr. Ander-
son and others who "found that violent video games caused psychological
damage to children."o70 The Eighth Circuit nonetheless determined that
the testimony was not the "substantial supporting evidence" required
under strict scrutiny and, thus, failed to support the County's interest in
preserving parental authority and the well-being of children.171
161. Id. at 579.
162. Id. at 579-80. But see Geoffrey R. Stone, Sex, Violence, and the First Amendment,
74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1857, 1860, 1869-70 (2007).
163. See Entm't Software Ass'n v. Foti, 451 F. Supp. 2d 823, 825 (M.D. La. 2006); see
also Entm't Software Ass'n v. Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d 646, 649 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
164. See also Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis Cnty., 329 F.3d 954, 956-57
(8th Cir. 2003).
165. See Entm't Software Ass'n v. Swanson, 519 F.3d 768, 769-70 (8th Cir. 2008).
166. See discussion infra note 248 and accompanying text.
167. St. Louis Cnty., 329 F.3d at 956.
168. See id. at 957, 959.
169. Id. at 958-60.
170. Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis Cnty., 200 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1129
(E.D. Mo. 2002).
171. St. Louis Cnty., 329 F.3d at 959. In reaching this result, the court incorporated
language from the Supreme Court case Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, namely that when
the government places restrictions on speech, "it must do more than simply posit the exis-
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The 2008 Eighth Circuit case involved a Minnesota state law prohibit-
ing "minors from purchasing or renting video games bearing a 'Mature'
or 'Adult Only' rating."172 As in the 2003 case, the court "accept[ed] as a
given that the State has a compelling interest in the psychological well-
being of its minor citizens."' 7 3 The court also considered research from
Dr. Anderson, this time "a meta-analysis performed . . . in 2004 . . .
[showing] that children's interaction with violent games causes violent be-
havior." 174 Significantly, this time the court found "that the State's evi-
dence provide[d] substantial support for its contention that violent video
games have a deleterious effect upon the psychological well-being of mi-
nors."175 The court acknowledged, nonetheless, that the 2003 ruling re-
quired it to apply a "heightened standard of proof" and the court found
that the "statistical certainty of causation demanded thereby" was not
met.176 Yet, the court also observed, "[i]n so holding, we are not as dis-
missive of that evidence as have been some of the courts that have found
similar evidence to be inadequate to establish the causal link between
exposure to violent video games and subsequent behavior."177 An
ecogenerist approach would not allow the court to ignore "substantial"
evidence demonstrating that playing violent video games harms children
as documented by social science, even in the face of precedent. This is
especially true when the precedent demands adherence to a test that fails
to account for real-world consequences.17 8 As a matter of judicial pro-
tence of the disease sought to be cured" and that the government "must demonstrate that
the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact allevi-
ate these harms in a direct and material way." Id. at 958 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc.
v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 624 (1994)). Reliance on Turner is interesting, as that case applied
intermediate scrutiny, not strict scrutiny, to uphold federal must-carry broadcast provisions
for cable television systems. Turner, 512 U.S. at 661-62. While it seems that the Eighth
Circuit intended to limit the use of Turner to an explanation of the evidence needed to
demonstrate "harm," the government in Schwarzenegger used Turner to suggest that a less-
strict standard should apply when reviewing the social science in this context and has made
this a key argument in petitioning the Supreme Court for review. See Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at *12-13, Schwarzenegger v. Video Software Dealers Ass'n, 130 S. Ct. 2398
(2009) (No. 08-1448), 2009 WL 1430036. But see Entm't Software Ass'n v. Hatch, 443 F.
Supp. 2d 1065, 1069 (D. Minn. 2006), affd sub nom. Entm't Software Ass'n. v. Swanson,
519 F.3d 768 (8th Cir. 2008) (observing that "Turner is inapposite[, as] [tihat case consid-
ered a statute subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny, a lesser standard than the strict
scrutiny established for video games by the Eighth Circuit" and that strict scrutiny requires
"substantial, actual 'empirical support for [the government's] belief that "violent" video
games cause psychological harm to minors."').
172. Swanson, 519 F.3d at 769.
173. Id. at 772.
174. Id. at 760-70 (citing Craig A. Anderson, An Update on the Effects of Playing Vio-
lent Video Games, 27 J. ADOLESCENCE 113, 115-21 (2004)).
175. Id. at 772 (emphasis added).
176. Id. (referring to test applied in St. Louis Cnty.).
177. Id. (citing Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 578-79 (7th
Cir. 2001); Entm't Software Ass'n v. Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d at 1051; Entm't Software
Ass'n v. Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d at 646, 653-59 (S.D. Mich. 2006); Video Software
Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, No. C-05-04188 RMW, 2007 WL 2261546, at *11 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 6, 2007)).
178. Woodhouse makes a similar point; she observes that "the First Amendment frame-
work seems inherently ill suited to addressing the seriousness and the complexity of the
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cess, of course, the Eighth Circuit was bound by the earlier ruling and
could only move away from that precedent with an en banc hearing,
which was requested but denied.179
During the five years that passed between the two Eighth Circuit cases,
several federal district courts also invalidated violent video game regula-
tions.180 Though they all are susceptible to similar criticisms when viewed
through the lens of ecogenerism, certain additional aspects of these deci-
sions are worth a brief mention. In 2004, a Washington district court
struck a state statute prohibiting the distribution to children of computer
and video games containing violence against law enforcement officers.' 8 '
Again, the court applied strict scrutiny and declined to use the Ginsberg
standard because the law involved violent, nonsexual, material.182 Ad-
dressing the social science, the court expressly found that the
government:
[P]resented research and expert opinions from which one could rea-
sonably infer that the depictions of violence . . . have some immedi-
ate and measurable effect on the level of aggression experienced by
some viewers and that the unique characteristics of video games ...
make[ I [them] potentially more harmful to the psychological well-
being of minors than other forms of media. In addition, virtually all
of the experts agree that prolonged exposure to violent entertain-
ment media is one of the constellation of risk factors for aggressive
or anti-social behavior.183
Nevertheless, the court found the government's evidence was insufficient
to satisfy strict scrutiny and also that the statute was "both over-inclusive
and under-inclusive" in that the range of games covered by the law did
not address the harms targeted by the legislature.184 As with the Eighth
Circuit, the court seemed uncomfortable with a test that failed to fully
account for harm to children evidenced by the social science.' 85
The next year, in 2005, an Illinois federal district court invalidated a
state statute criminalizing the rental or sale of violent video games to
minors.186 Following Kendrick, the court applied strict scrutiny.187 The
effects on children of growing up in a culture saturated with violence." Woodhouse, Clean-
ing, supra note 123, at 429.
179. Swanson, 519 F.3d at 768 (rehearing and rehearing en banc denied May 7, 2008)
(noting that Judge Shepherd would have granted the rehearing en banc).
180. See Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d at 656; see also Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d at 1055;
Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1191 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
181. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d at 1190.
182. Id. at 1185-86. Instead, the court applied strict scrutiny and discussed Turner at
length for the propositions that "courts must 'accord substantial deference to the predictive
judgments' of the legislature [, but] [w]here the challenged legislation restricts or limits
freedom of speech, however, the courts must ensure that the legislature's judgments are
based on reasonable inferences drawn from substantial evidence." Id. at 1187 (citing Tur-
ner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665, 666 (1994)) (citations omitted).
183. Id. at 1188.
184. Id. at 1189.
185. See id. at 1187-88.
186. Entm't Software Ass'n v. Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1081 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
187. Id. at 1078.
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court considered over a dozen social science studies but found that
"neither Dr. Anderson's testimony nor his research establish a solid
causal link between violent video game exposure and aggressive thinking
and behavior."1 88 The court also considered a labeling requirement that
the targeted video games contain a two-inch by two-inch sticker stating
"18," treating it as constitutionally impermissible compelled speech
rather than commercial speech.189
Two state statutes were invalidated in 2006, one in Michigan and the
second in Louisiana.190 The Michigan statute prohibited distribution of
violent video games to minors, applying in part a definition incorporating
language upheld in Ginsberg.191 Once again, the court applied strict scru-
tiny and rejected the research from Dr. Anderson and others.192 The
court also found the statute's language troubling both because it was not
narrowly tailored and because it was likely to have a chilling effect on
adults' free expression.193 The Louisiana statute "criminaliz[ed] the sale,
lease, or rental of video or computer games that appeal to a minor's mor-
bid interest in violence."194 Relying on the line of violent video game
cases, the court applied strict scrutiny to find the statute
unconstitutional.195
Finally, in 2007, an Oklahoma federal district court invalidated a state
statute criminalizing the display, sale, or other dissemination to minors of
any material deemed "harmful to minors."1 96 In addition to arguing for
review under Ginsberg, the government cited United States v. American
Library Ass'n "for the proposition that the government may make rea-
sonable restrictions in content-based judgments on private speech," even
if the restrictions constitute "a slight inconvenience to adults."1 97 The
court rejected both arguments, following the reasoning of the other
courts on Ginsberg and finding American Library "inapposite to .. . gov-
ernment restrictions on private speech" as it "applied [only] in the con-
text of a public library's exercise of judgment in filtering the internet
material it provided to patrons."198
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1081-82 (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Council, 471 U.S. 626, 647
(1985) (applying test for commercial speech under Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566-71 (1980)); Riley v. Nat'l. Fed'n of the Blind, 487
U.S. 781, 786 (1988) (applying strict scrutiny as test for compelled speech).
190. Entm't Software Ass'n v. Foti, 451 F. Supp. 2d 823, 825 (M.D. La. 2006); Entm't
Software Ass'n v. Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d 646, 649 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
191. Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d at 649. The statute also covered sexual material,
though that portion was not challenged in the litigation.
192. See id. at 651-53.
193. See id. at 653-54.
194. Foti, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 825.
195. Id. at 831 (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664-65 (1994)).
196. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n v. Henry, No. CIV-06-675-C, 2007 WL 2743097, at *1 (W.D.
Okla. Sept. 17, 2007).
197. Id. at *4 (citation and punctuation omitted).
198. Id. (citation and punctuation omitted).
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Applying ecogenerist principles to this line of cases addressing regula-
tion of modern video game violence reveals serious concerns both in the
courts' application of First Amendment scrutiny and in the courts' evalu-
ation of the social science. These concerns are made all the more appar-
ent in a careful study of the Schwarzenegger case.
2. Evaluating Schwarzenegger Under Ecogenerist Principles
Following a brief background on the statute at issue, the concept of
ecogenerism is tested in the context of Schwarzenegger to evaluate
whether the theory might have practical application. In addition to suf-
fering from the flaws of the other cases, Schwarzenegger presents an op-
portunity to effectuate the very kind of paradigm shift ecogenerism
envisions.
a. The Challenged Statute
In 2005, the California legislature passed and Governor Schwarzeneg-
ger signed into law a statute imposing restrictions and a labeling require-
ment on the sale or rental of violent video games to minors. 199 The
statute defined a "violent video game" as a game that "includes killing,
maiming, dismembering, or sexually assaulting an image of a human be-
ing," where the game either (1) as toward minors ". . .appeals to a deviant
or morbid interest . . . is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the
community . . . [and] lack[s] serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value" or (2) "[e]nables . . . virtual[ ] inflict[ion of] serious injury . . . [in
an] especially heinous, cruel, or depraved [manner]." 200 It also defined
the terms "cruel," "depraved," "heinous," and "serious physical abuse"
based upon federal death penalty instructions and listed as pertinent fac-
tors "infliction of gratuitous violence upon the victim beyond that neces-
sary to commit the killing, needless mutilation of the victim's body, and
helplessness of the victim." 201
Significantly, the statute did not prohibit a parent or guardian from
purchasing or renting the games for the minor and intentionally pre-
served full First Amendment protection of the material for distribution to
adults.
The lower court described the kind of video game that would be sub-
ject to the statute:
Postal II involves a character who has apparently "gone postal" and
decided to kill everyone he encounters.... The game involves shoot-
ing both armed opponents, such as police officers, and unarmed peo-
199. Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir.
2009), cert. granted sub nom. Schwarzenegger v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 130 S. Ct. 2398
(Apr. 26, 2010) (No. 08-1448).
200. Id. at 953-54 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1746-.5 (West 2009)).
201. Id. at 954 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1746-.5 (West 2009)). The record indicated
that these terms were used by the legislature specifically "because they survived claims of
unconstitutional vagueness in United States v. Jones, 132 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 1998)." Id. at
954 n.7.
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ple, such as schoolgirls. Girls attacked with a shovel will beg for
mercy; the player can be merciless and decapitate them. People shot
in the leg will fall down and crawl; the player can then pour gasoline
over them, set them on fire, and urinate on them. The player's char-
acter makes sardonic comments during all this; for example, urinat-
ing on someone elicits the comment "Now the flowers will grow." 202
Prior to adoption of the statute, "the California Legislature considered
numerous studies, peer-reviewed articles, and reports from social scien-
tists and medical associations that establish a correlation between violent
video game play and increased automatic aggressiveness, aggressive
thoughts and behavior, antisocial behavior, and desensitization to vio-
lence in minors and adults." 203 In addition to this social science research,
the legislature also reviewed "the Federal Trade Commission's report that
the video game industry specifically marketed M-rated (Mature) video
games to minors, that 69% of 13 to 16-year-old children were able to
purchase M-rated games, and that only 24% of cashiers asked the minor's
age." 204 Soon after the statute was signed into law, the Video Software
Dealers Association (now known as the Entertainment Merchants Asso-
ciation) and the Entertainment Software Association filed a lawsuit in
federal district court against the government challenging the statute's
constitutionality.205 Applying the precedent from the previous violent
video game legislation cases, the lower court permanently enjoined the
statute as unconstitutional. 206
On appeal, in an effort to distinguish the case from the other unsuc-
cessful cases, the government advanced four key arguments.207 First, the
government contended that violent material should be regulated under
the variable obscenity standard in Ginsberg.208 Second, the government
submitted that social science research had advanced considerably since
initially evaluated by other courts and now demonstrated conclusively the
requisite causal connection between playing the targeted video games
202. Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1042
(N.D. Cal. 2005) aff'd, 556 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). The lower court
"agree[d] with the [government] that Postal II would fall within the [statute's] definition of
'violent video game."' Id.
203. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Schwarzenegger v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 130
S. Ct. 2398 (2009) (No. 08-1448), 2009 WL 1430036 at *2.
204. Id. at *2-3 (citations omitted).
205. See Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, No. C-05-04188 RMW, 2007
WL 2261546 (N.D. Cal. 2007), affd, 556 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub nom.
Schwarzenegger v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 130 S. Ct. 2398 (Apr. 26, 2010) (No. 08-1448).
206. See id. at *9-10 (granting permanent injunction and finding that while the govern-
ment articulated a compelling interest in regulating children's access to violent video
games, the government failed to select the least restrictive means in furtherance of that
interest). See also Video Software Dealers Ass'n, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 1042 (issuing prelimi-
nary injunction based on findings that the statute's restrictions against minors' possession
of violent video games and the labeling requirement violated the First Amendment, but
holding that the definition of "violent video game" was not unconstitutionally vague).
207. Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 957-65 (9th Cir.
2009), cert. granted sub nom. Schwarzenegger v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 130 S. Ct. 2398
(Apr. 26, 2010) (No. 08-1448).
208. Id. at 957-58.
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and increased violent behavior or aggression, even under a strict scrutiny
review.209 Third, the government argued that the statute was more nar-
rowly drawn than versions rendered unconstitutional in the other cases,
as the statute did not prohibit children from playing or possessing the
video games; rather, it required that a parent or guardian make the
purchase but placed absolutely no restriction on adults' access to the
targeted material.210 Fourth, the government argued that the statute's re-
quirement for a "violent video game" package to contain a sticker read-
ing "18" was "purely commercial" in nature and should be upheld as
"rationally related to the State's self-evident purpose of communicating
to consumers and store clerks that the video game cannot be legally pur-
chased by anyone under 18 years of age." 211 None of these arguments
persuaded the Ninth Circuit.212
b. Selecting the Appropriate Level of Scrutiny
Addressing the level of First Amendment protection, the Ninth Circuit
recognized the repeated resistance by other courts to include violence
under the umbrella of obscenity, regardless of Ginsberg's holding that
material may be regulated as obscene to children even if it is not obscene
as to adults.213 The court took care to note both the Supreme Court's
historical position "consistently address[ing] obscenity with reference to
sex-based materials," not violent materials, and the history of other
courts rejecting requests to apply lesser protection to violent speech
under the definition of obscenity or Ginsberg.214 The court also ex-
pressed concern about "boldly go[ing] where no court has gone before"
and thus "decline[d] the [government's] entreaty to extend the reach of
Ginsberg and thereby redefine the concept of obscenity under the First
Amendment." 215 Like all of the courts before it, the Ninth Circuit's anal-
ysis was devoid of any developed inquiry into, let alone prioritization of,
the children's interests at stake or concerns for future generations. 216 In
contrast, an ecogenerist approach would shift the focus from whether the
targeted material may be subject to regulation under existing First
Amendment obscenity jurisprudence to whether material is harmful to
children, an approach that is supported (or at least not rejected) by
Ginsberg.217
209. Id. at 962-65.
210. Id. at 964-65.
211. Id. (punctuation omitted). The court declined to rule on the labeling require-
ment's constitutionality given that the rest of the statute was rendered invalid. Id. at
966-67.
212. Id. at 967.
213. Id. at 959, 960.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 961.
216. See generally id.
217. See discussion of Ginsberg, supra Part H.A. Admittedly, a shift like this in First
Amendment analysis is contemplated as academic theory rather than committed to actual
practice. A number of legal commentators have proposed various alternative tests, ranging
from the obscenity/Ginsberg exception discussed here to protecting only political speech
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c. Evaluating the Social Science
Not surprisingly, given the precedent from other video game violence
cases, the Ninth Circuit applied strict scrutiny to evaluate the govern-
ment's interest in preventing psychological or neurological harm to the
brains of children playing violent video games.218 The court "'recognized
that there is a compelling interest in protecting the physical and psycho-
logical well-being of minors,"' but also observed, following previous
courts' use of Turner, that "when the government seeks to restrict speech
'[i]t must demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not merely conjec-
tural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct
and material way." 219 The court also drew upon language from a subse-
quent opinion in the Turner litigation: "[a]lthough we must accord defer-
ence to the predictive judgments of the legislature, 'our obligation is to
assure that, in formulating its judgments, [the legislature] has drawn rea-
sonable inferences based on substantial evidence." 220
The government's evidence to prove harm consisted primarily of re-
search by Dr. Anderson and his colleagues. 221 In an effort to respond to
the previous courts' rulings dismissing social science evidence, the gov-
ernment focused on Dr. Anderson's 2004 meta-analysis study (i.e., a
"quantitative method for integrating existing studies") demonstrating a
link between exposure to violent video games and increased aggressive
behavior, cognition, and affect as well as cardiovascular arousal and de-
creased helping behavior. 222 The court found the research unconvincing,
however, citing Dr. Anderson's own disclaimers regarding the small sam-
ple size, lack of longitudinal studies, and limited focus on children under
though ultimately none of these alternative tests has been adopted. See Garry, supra note
105, at 140-41, 60. For other alternative proposals, see Saunders, Regulating, supra note 4.
Woodhouse's theory of ecogenerism stands apart from these various proposals, however, in
its calling for a child and future generational focus based on environmental concerns. See
Woodhouse, Ecogenerism, supra note 113, at 241-42. For another source of authority
where children's interests are taken into account when evaluating content-based restric-
tions, see the Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 17, U.N. Doc. AIRES/44/25, Nov.
20, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1448, 1462-63, available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/44/
a44r025.htm (requiring signatories to "ensure that the child has access to information and
material" but qualifying this in allowing "appropriate guidelines for the protection of the
child from information and material injurious to his or her well-being").
218. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 961.
219. Id. at 962 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997)) (cita-
tions omitted).
220. See id. (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997)).
221. Id. at 963.
222. Id. at 963 n.16 (citing Craig A. Anderson, An Update on the Effects of Playing
Violent Video Games, 27 J. ADOLESCENCE 113 (2004)). See also Appellants' Opening Br.
29, Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950 (2008) (No. 07-16620),
2008 WL 412514 at *29 [hereinafter App. Open Br.] ("For example, in 2004 (nearly four
years after Judge Posner's opinion . . . striking down a similar but less specific law), Dr.
Anderson reported that an 'updated meta-analysis reveals that exposure to violent video
games is significantly linked to increases in aggressive behaviour, aggressive cognition, ag-
gressive affect, and cardiovascular arousal, and to decreases in helping behaviour.' Dr.
Anderson explained that '[e]xperimental studies reveal this linkage to be causal."') (quot-
ing Anderson, An Update on the Effects of Playing Video Games, 24 J. ADOLESCENCE 113,
113-22 (2004)).
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the age of eighteen. 223 The court disregarded social science evidence
from other sources on similar grounds.224 Concluding that the evidence
"does not support the Legislature's purported interest in preventing psy-
chological or neurological harm," the court seemed most concerned with
the lack of evidence establishing "a causal link between minors playing
violent video games and actual psychological or neurological harm." 225
The court recognized that the research established a correlation between
violent video game play and increased violent or aggressive behavior but
determined that causation- not correlation-should be the primary fo-
cus. 2 2 6 The court's conclusion regarding the value of causation evidence
over correlation evidence was not grounded in the social science but was
merely a substitution of its own judgment for that of the legislature.227
There are a number of other ways an ecogenerist approach might be
applied to address concerns related to social science. Just as environmen-
tal law is centered on empirical research, 228 many of the violent video
game cases also focused heavily on empirical research (or the lack of such
research) in evaluating the legislature's justifications for enacting regula-
tions.229 Yet, each court approached the analysis in its own unique way,
without reference to a uniform set of standards, other than passing men-
tion of the fact that other courts had rejected similar, sometimes out-
dated, evidence in prior cases. As an alternative, Woodhouse proposes:
"Imagine a regulatory scheme designed to preserve the environment for
children's healthy development that relied on established evidence-based
benchmarks similar to those in various environmental laws." 230 Such a
scheme could adjust the current balancing of protection for children
against adult free speech rights to allow for appropriate regulation drawn
from objective criteria supported by scientific evidence, not ideological
positions.231
Whether ecogenerism's evidence-based set of benchmarks would have
altered the outcome of Schwarzenegger is uncertain, but the court's opin-
ion reflects the need for that sort of measure. Acknowledging a "lay re-
view" of the evidence and that the government is not required "to
demonstrate a scientific certainty,"232 the court nonetheless required such
223. See Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 963.
224. See id. at 963-64.
225. Id. at 964.
226. Id.
227. See id.
228. Woodhouse, Refrarning, supra note 1, at 147.
229. See, e.g., Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 964; Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Ken-
drick, 244 F.3d 572, 578-79 (7th Cir. 2001).
230. Woodhouse, Ecogenerism, supra note 113, at 442 (citation omitted). For concerns
related to the use of empirical evidence or a set of specific, science-based criteria in the
context of evaluating media harm to children, see Garfield, supra note 36, at 589-92,
608-16.
231. One way to accomplish this might be to apply Turner's intermediate scrutiny test
for evaluating the social science, an argument advanced by the government in its petition
to the Supreme Court for review. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
232. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 963-64.
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certainty. Moreover, it is virtually impossible, given the varied standards
employed by the courts, to discern what amount of evidence, if any, a
court would find sufficient to uphold legislation of this nature. If, in fact,
long-term empirical proof of a direct causal link is required, it may very
well be that such evidence is unobtainable, especially to the extent harm
might be caused to children in the laboratory research setting.233
The environmentalist concept of the "precautionary principle" is also
relevant here.2 3 4 This principle, explains Woodhouse, "made explicit in
various environmental treaties and conventions, holds that we should not
require scientific certainty about the precise effects of a course of conduct
before regulating it, if the possible risks of leaving it unregulated may be
serious or irreversible." 23 5 Thus, Woodhouse concludes that research
clearly establishing but falling short of conclusively proving a causal con-
nection between harm to children and exposure to media violence could
be relied upon by legislators in adopting regulations so long as it is rooted
in science-not popular opinion.236 If this were the standard, then the
outcome of Schwarzenegger surely would be different, as the court readily
acknowledged that a correlation between harm to children and exposure
to media violence had been established. 237
d. Narrowly Tailored Language and Less Restrictive Alternatives
Regarding the government's argument that the statute was more nar-
rowly tailored than other states' previous efforts, the court again dis-
agreed and found the burden to show that no less restrictive alternatives
were available was not met.2 3 8 Specifically, the court listed other alterna-
tives, such as a voluntary rating system, parental controls on modern
gaming systems, and enhanced education campaigns, even if such options
might not be as effective. 239 Ecogenerism reveals the disingenuous na-
ture of alternatives like industry self-regulation or parental control, which
profess to be solutions but fail in actual practice.240 As Woodhouse
explains:
233. See, e.g., Kevin W. Saunders, A Disconnect Between Law and Neuroscience: Mod-
ern Brain Science, Media Influences and Juvenile Justice, 2005 UTAH L. REv. 695, 724-25
[hereinafter Saunders, Disconnect]; Brian Varstag, Does Video Game Violence Sow Aggres-
sion?, 291 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 1822, 1822 (2004); see also App. Open. Br., supra note 222, at
*37 ("Never has a state been required to perform experiments on children in order to
justify legislation seeking to protect them from harm. No responsible governing body
would ever consider doing so."). See also FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct.
1800, 1813 (2009) ("There are some propositions for which scant empirical evidence can be
marshaled, and the harmful effect of broadcast profanity on children is one of them. One
cannot demand a multiyear controlled study, in which some children are intentionally ex-
posed to indecent broadcasts (and insulated from all other indecency), and others are
shielded from all indecency.").
234. Woodhouse, Ecogenerism, supra note 113, at 439 (citation omitted).
235. Id. (citation omitted).
236. Id. at 440-41.
237. Woodhouse, Reframing, supra note 1, at 126.
238. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 964-65.
239. Id. at 965.
240. Woodhouse, Reframing, supra note 1, at 126.
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Parent-activated internet filters, V-chips, and special web zones to
which parents may subscribe their children, all fail to protect the
child whose parent is either uninterested or unable to enforce (or
afford) these child-safe zones. Moreover, individualized parental
control may be a wholly ineffective alternative to government regu-
lation. As with contagious diseases and firearms, when one child in a
peer group is exposed to risk, the entire group is potentially
exposed. 2 4 1
The Schwarzenegger court relied on these purported solutions to find that
the government failed to show that no less burdensome alternatives ex-
isted.2 4 2 The ecogenerist perspective reveals why the court should not
have done so.
e. The Reality of a Paradigm Shift
Despite the courts' continued insistence that extreme violence in video
games is protected speech under the First Amendment and subject to
strict scrutiny review, the Supreme Court has never addressed the issue
directly.2 4 3 The Court soon will do so, however, in Schwarzenegger, as
the Court granted certiorari and will consider the case during the 2010
Term. 2 " The Schwarzenegger petition argues, much in the spirit of
Woodhouse's ecogenerism, that "[d]espite the lack of a split among the
circuit courts, this is an issue of national importance. . .. [and] [a]fter 40
years, this Court should consider extending Ginsberg to help states meet
a new, modern threat to children." 245 This appeal invites the Court to
enact the paradigm shift that ecogenerism demands in this area of the
law. 2 4 6 While some speculate that the Court is unlikely to do so given the
uniform holdings of other courts on this issue, 2 4 7 an ecogenerist perspec-
241. Id. (citation omitted); see also FCC, supra note 7, at 7942-43.
242. See Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 965. Consider also Woodhouse's example of air
pollution, where environmental law would not be satisfied with a response that placed the
responsibility of children's exposure to toxic air pollution on a parent's decision to keep
the child indoors. See Woodhouse, Reframing, supra note 1, at 126. Similarly, it follows
that ameliorating the harms of media cannot be left to parents alone.
243. See, e.g., Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1034,
1045 (N.D. Cal. 2005), affd, 556 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub nom.
Schwarzenegger v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 130 S. Ct. 2398 (Apr. 26, 2010) ("Nor, on the
other hand, have the plaintiffs shown that . . . the Supreme Court . . . has ever held that
sexual obscenity represents a unique category of expression that is the only category to
which a state may permissibly restrict minors' access without running afoul of the First
Amendment.").
244. Schwarzenegger v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 130 S. Ct. 2398 (2010).
245. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, id. (No. 08-1448), 2009 WL 1430036 at *6.
246. The paradigm shift must occur on two levels. First, in the area of child law,
ecogenerism demands that the influence of mass media and marketing be recognized
within the parent-child-state triangle (perhaps with the model remaining a triangle but
placing the child at the center and the three influences at the points or, as Woodhouse
describes, all parties "linked together, awash in a sea of culture)." Woodhouse, Reframing,
supra note 1, at 129. Second, in the area of constitutional law, ecogenerism demands that
traditional First Amendment liberties yield to children's interests in certain limited
circumstances.
247. See, e.g., Editorial, Video Games and Free Speech, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2010, at
A32; Linda Greenhouse, The Court as Mr. Fix-it?, N.Y. TIMEs, April 30, 2010, at A19.
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tive would contend that the Court cannot afford to perpetuate the lower
courts' continued rejection of laws like the regulation at issue in
Schwarzenegger.
As the Eighth Circuit acknowledged in Swanson, applying strict scru-
tiny to extreme violence "reflect[s] a refined estrangement from real-
ity."248 The need for the Supreme Court to finally address the treatment
of violent material under the First Amendment is made all the more obvi-
ous when considering the line of violent video game cases from an
ecogenerist perspective. The emergence of environmental law and its in-
fluence in reframing traditional property rights and land use law can offer
inspiration, though not direct precedent, for the paradigm shift that
would be required in First Amendment violent video game jurispru-
dence.249 The Supreme Court appears poised to act upon this opportu-
nity, which is timely and important regardless of the outcome given that
states continue to adopt laws regulating the access of minors to violent
video games even in the face of uniform precedent against such
legislation.250
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
AND REGULATION
After reviewing the existing legal framework and after considering the
reality of a paradigm shift, this article concludes with recommendations
for future research and regulatory efforts related to children and harmful
media. Examining the violent video game precedent from an ecogenerist
perspective reveals how critical it is for the Supreme Court to take up
Schwarzenegger. Even if the Court declines to reverse the Ninth Circuit's
invalidation of the statute, social science researchers and legal advocates
have much to gain by applying principles of ecogenerism to their future
studies and legislative proposals. Courts, legal commentators, and social
scientists all have offered suggestions for future research and regulation
under the existing legal framework. These recommendations, filtered
through an ecogenerist viewpoint, are summarized below.
Proposals for future research and regulation from law scholars and
judges primarily focus on a narrowed approach, whether in the language
used or in the underlying research. 251 For example, in Kendrick, Judge
Posner advised that future research should be tied directly to the particu-
lar video game or media subject and involve children of the age subject to
248. Entm't Software Ass'n v. Swanson, 519 F.3d 768, 772 (8th Cir. 2008).
249. Woodhouse, Ecogenerism, supra note 113, at 447. As Woodhouse recognizes,
traditional family law provides another example of paradigm shift, moving from treatment
of children as property of parents to the "very different overarching ethical principle [of
looking to] the best interest of the child." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
250. See, e.g., N.Y. State Assembly, No. A01474 (2009) (proposed bill prohibits "the
sale to minors of certain rated video games containing a rating that reflects content of
various degrees of profanity, racist stereotypes or derogatory language, and/or actions to-
ward a specific group of persons").
251. See, e.g., Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 578-79, 580 (7th
Cir. 2001).
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the regulation with a sufficient demonstration of causation. 252 He also
stated that "a more narrowly drawn ordinance might survive a constitu-
tional challenge." 253 Judge Lasnik in Maleng listed three key considera-
tions for future regulation: (1) the law should apply only to "depraved or
extreme acts of violence that violate community norms and prompted the
legislature to act"; (2) the law should ban "depictions of extreme violence
against all innocent victims, regardless of their viewpoint or status"; and
(3) "social scientific studies [must] support the legislative findings." 254
Similarly, Professor Saunders has indicated "that a statute limited to vio-
lent, or perhaps only to first-person shooter, video games" might with-
stand scrutiny.255 As Professor Ross also has observed, "[t]o provide
legally convincing evidence . . . studies would need to distinguish more
carefully among factors such as the level of exposure to violent entertain-
ment, and violence and poverty in the community." 256 She also expresses
concern about the definitional problem associated with the term "media
violence" in that research studies define it inconsistently (if at all), and
she suggests that future studies "must be carefully crafted to identify the
precise harm caused by the speech, and to show that restrictions on
speech would directly and materially alleviate the harm."257 Others look
to advances in neuroscience and the use of MRI as possible future
sources for producing the evidence that courts seek.2 5 8 Significantly, all
of these recommendations focus on shortcomings of the legislative lan-
guage or the research studies, whereas an ecogenerist perspective would
also focus on the standards courts use to review the legislation and to
evaluate the social science. This is not to say that recommendations from
legal academics and judges should be ignored, but they should not be
considered alone.
Interestingly, and possibly reflecting frustration with the courts' re-
peated rejections of violent video game regulations, researchers Gentile,
Saleem, and Anderson recently proposed a moratorium of five to ten
years on any legislation.259 During that time, they recommend several
actions. First, train lawyers and judges in collaboration with scientists on
"the meaning of causality in science, and how to interpret the empirical
data [. . . , since] [1]awyers and judges often are asked to make compli-
252. See id. at 578-79.
253. Id. at 580.
254. Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1190 (W.D. Wash.
2004).
255. Kevin W. Saunders, The Need for a Two (or More) Tiered First Amendment to
Provide for the Protection of Children, 79 CHI-KENT L. REv. 257, 264 (2004).
256. Ross, Constitutional, supra note 12, at 301.
257. Id. at 302.
258. See generally Jonathan Chananie, Violent Video Games, Crime, and the Law:
Looking for Proof of a Causal Connection, 26 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L. 27 (2007). See
also Saunders, Disconnect, supra note 233, at 265-68.
259. Gentile, Public, supra note 2, at 47. See also Gentile, Violent, supra note 2, at
238-40 (listing future public policy options including education, voluntary ratings,
mandatory ratings with industry or third-party enforcement, advisory governmental rat-
ings, legal access restrictions, and government production restrictions).
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cated judgments about scientific issues, but they do this without the bene-
fit of having training in those sciences." 260 Second, establish uniform
guidelines for expert qualifications. For example, in the context of video
game regulation, it is "relatively easy for the entertainment industries to
hire 'experts' to refute the scientific findings . . . [but] none of the video
game industry 'experts' in the cases to date would be considered by the
scientific community as real experts on media violence." 261 Third, help
researchers understand "that the judicial courts use different standards of
causality than most social scientists, and that these standards change de-
pending on the type of legal issue. In particular, if the issue is about regu-
lating access to speech, the U.S. courts are very conservative because
speech is at the core of democracy." 262 Finally, design research that fo-
cuses on (1) immediate harm rather than cumulative long-term effects;
(2) harm to the viewing child as well as harm to others; (3) real-world
contexts and distinguishing the effect of media violence after taking into
account other factors; and (4) results courts will rely upon for regulating
speech rather than the most cutting-edge research.263
A number of these actions reflect ecogenerist values 2 6 4 though the
moratorium does not. As the early environmentalists and others at the
forefront of major social movements know, continued legal challenges
can serve as a catalyst for change even in the face of defeat. Further-
more, in addition to narrowing studies to fit existing legal requirements as
proposed by the researchers, ecogenerism would encourage expanded re-
search focused on developing an entirely new regulatory framework sup-
ported by established scientific benchmarks to evaluate media harm.2 6 5
Finally, ecogenerism would incorporate media literacy education, "no
child left inside" programs, and similar efforts as central to the legislative
agenda and future research directives, at least to the extent these efforts
were maintained with children's interests as paramount.266 For example,
Heins and Cho maintain that as an alternative to regulation on children's
access to media, legislation should encourage and facilitate youth media
260. Gentile, Public, supra note 2, at 45.
261. Id. at 46.
262. Id.
263. See id. at 46-47.
264. That proposals from social scientists are similar to ecogenerism is not surprising
given that psychologists and sociologists have long considered the "ecology of child devel-
opment." Woodhouse, Reframing, supra note 1, at 92 (citations omitted).
265. Perhaps ecogenerist arguments also will convince Congress to finally pass the Chil-
dren and Media Research Act, a $95 million proposal to fund expanded research on media
and children that has been introduced several times, most recently in 2007. See Children
and Media Research Advancement Act, S. 948, 110th Cong. § 301 (2007); see also Wood-
house, Ecogenerism, supra note 113, at 435 ("Research into what is happening to children
in the mesosystems, microsystems, and exosystems studied by child development theorists
is a necessity, and review and evaluation must be an essential part of new programs, not an
afterthought to be included if funding permits.").
266. See, e.g., Woodhouse, Reframing, supra note 1, at 142; Press Release, Conn. Gov.
M. Jodi Rell, No Child Left in Ride to Get Youngsters Outside, Showcase State Parks, U.S.
State News (March 22, 2006), available at 2006 WLNR 4886180 [hereinafter Press Release,
Gov. Rell].
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education programs. 267 In particular, they argue that the "federal gov-
ernment should create guidelines for media literacy education which rec-
ognize that critical thinking is the goal, and that media literacy is more
than simply an 'inoculation' against violent, sexual, or other controversial
content in art and entertainment." 2 6 8 Reviewing what they call "a patch-
work quilt of nonprofit advocacy groups, for-profit providers of curricular
materials, and assorted state and local initiatives" that currently attempt
to address media literacy efforts, they propose that much could be gained
from a federally-driven national initiative (and cite other countries' suc-
cessful efforts in this regard, such as those of Canada, England, and Aus-
tralia). 269 As for "no child left inside" programs, these initiatives also try
to address media influence without direct regulation of children's ac-
cess. 2 7 0 Instead, children are encouraged to participate in outdoor educa-
tion activities as an alternative (or in addition) to media-related activities
like television and video games. 271 Lastly, in an effort to help educate
parents and other video game purchasers, some states have enacted laws
requiring video game retailers to display information about the industry
ratings systems.272 Media literacy, outdoor education, and ratings sys-
tems awareness may not be the entire solution, but programs like these
do offer immediate steps that address ecogenerist concerns about media
harm to children.
V. CONCLUSION
The law's continued refusal to recognize mass media and marketing
harm to children has left researchers and regulators in a strange position,
waiting until science might sufficiently advance to satisfy a court's causal-
ity requirements and in the meantime engaging in a seemingly fruitless
exercise of tweaking statutory language in an effort to survive First
Amendment strict scrutiny. Like the early environmentalists, mass media
reform advocates have harnessed the social science but have lacked the
regulatory framework necessary to convert the research results into real
change. As this article has shown in revisiting the line of cases striking
down legislative efforts to protect children from the harms of violent
video game play, ecogenerism offers compelling arguments for a para-
267. See generally Marjorie Heins & Christina Cho, Media Literacy: An Alternative to
Censorship, Free Expression Policy Project (2003), available at http://www.fepproject.org/
policyreports/medialiteracy.pdf.
268. Id. at 1.
269. Id. at 20, 20-37.
270. See, e.g., Press Release, Gov. Rell, supra note 266.
271. See, e.g., id. (quoting Connecticut Governor Rell on the launching of a statewide
initiative, "No Child Left Inside will provide the incentive youngsters need to turn off their
computers, cell phones and video games and get back outside"). In a related effort, the
U.S. Congress currently is considering a federal environmental literacy program as part of
the No Child Left Inside Act of 2009, H.R. 2054, 111th Cong. (2009).
272. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 19.188.040 (2008) (requiring video game retailers to
"post signs providing information to consumers about the existence of a nationally recog-
nized video game system or notifying consumers that a rating system is available to aid in
the selection if such a rating system is in existence").
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digm shift. This article demonstrates that the ecogenerist perspective de-
mands reversal of the Ninth Circuit's decision to invalidate the violent
video game sales statute at issue in the Schwarzenegger case. Should the
Supreme Court decline to do so, future research initiatives and legislative
action, nonetheless, can benefit from incorporating the ecogenerist
perspective.
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